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361 
OUR CORROSIVE OCEANS: EXPLORING 
REGULATORY RESPONSES AND A POSSIBLE ROLE 
FOR TRIBES 
Weston R. LeMay 
Abstract: The world’s oceans act as a carbon sink, absorbing roughly twenty-five percent 
of humanity’s carbon dioxide emissions. As a result, ocean acidity has increased sixty 
percent since the beginning of the industrial era. Acidification is a burgeoning ocean health 
crisis—present levels of acidity already threaten species of oyster, plankton, and salmon. 
Disturbingly, the capacity of the American legal system to respond is unclear: the complexity 
of climate change-related harms typically precludes a remedy at common law. With respect 
to mitigating near-shore acidification, this Comment argues that a regulatory strategy 
utilizing the Clean Water Act’s Total Maximum Daily Load (TMDL) regime holds more 
promise than a tort response. Furthermore, in the Pacific Northwest, it may be possible to 
bolster TMDL regulation of non-point pollution through engagement with often-overlooked 
stakeholders: the Stevens Treaties tribes. 
INTRODUCTION 
In the summer of 2007, oyster larvae at the Whiskey Creek Hatchery 
began dying by the millions.
1
 Located on Netarts Bay in Oregon, the 
Whiskey Creek Shellfish Hatchery raised larvae (also known as “seed”) 
for shellfish growers along the Pacific Coast.
2
 Hatchery managers, 
scrambling to find the cause of the die off, quickly eliminated bacteria or 
disease in their tanks—other private growers had also suffered 
significant losses that year, as did wild larvae in Washington’s Willapa 
Bay.
3
 After two years of research, National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA) scientists suggested a culprit: the rising acidity 
of seawater.
4
 Under laboratory conditions, studies showed that exposure 
to increasingly acidic water negatively impacted shell-forming marine 
organisms, including oysters.
5
 One study specifically investigated the 
                                                     
1. Eric Scigliano, The Great Oyster Crash, ONEARTH MAG. (Aug. 17, 2011), 
http://archive.onearth.org/article/oyster-crash-ocean-acidification [https://perma.cc/3T7M-S43F]. 
2. Id.  
3. Id.  
4. See generally Scott C. Doney et al., Ocean Acidification: the Other CO2 Problem, 1 ANN. REV. 
MARINE SCI. 169 (2009). 
5. Id. at 177–78 (summarizing studies showing that exposure to waters with elevated CO2 results 
in shell malformation, slower growth, and impaired calcification (the formation of calcium 
carbonate shells) in oysters, mussels, and calcifying plankton). 
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vulnerability of the Pacific oyster (Cassostrea Gigas, a species grown by 
Whiskey Creek) and found that ninety-five percent of the larvae in 
acidified water developed malformed shells—or grew no shells at all.6 
NOAA scientists, including Dr. Richard Feely, Ph.D., later replicated 
these results under real world conditions at the Whiskey Creek 
Hatchery.
7
 By testing the water flowing into the hatchery during a period 
of naturally higher acidity, Dr. Feely confirmed that ocean acidification 
is—at minimum—a contributing factor to oyster seed mortality.8 
Ocean acidification is the process by which seawater becomes more 
acidic through the absorption of atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO2).
9
 
Acidification is a global concern, creating risks for shellfish and 
corals—economically and ecologically important organisms which may 
struggle to survive in increasingly acidic ocean environments.
10
 If 
scientists’ acidification projections are correct, by the year 2100 
seawater will be so corrosive that some organisms may simply 
dissolve.
11
 Simultaneously, the same chemical reaction increasing 
seawater acidity also reduces the availability of minerals used by 
shellfish and other organisms to build their shells and skeletal 
                                                     
6. Haruko Kurihara et al., Effects of Increased Seawater pCO2 on Early Development of the 
Oyster Crassostrea Gigas, 1 AQUATIC BIOLOGY 91, 91 (2007) (showing negative impact on Pacific 
oyster larvae from exposure to water with a pH of 7.4 for forty-eight hours). The Pacific oyster was 
one of the species that exhibited significantly increased larval mortality during the 2007 low-pH 
event. See Scigliano, supra note 1. 
7. See generally Alan Barton et al., The Pacific Oyster, Crassostrea Gigas, Shows Negative 
Correlation to Naturally Elevated Carbon Dioxide Levels: Implications for Near-term Ocean 
Acidification Effects, 57 LIMNOLOGY & OCEANOGRAPHY 698 (2012) (reporting data collected from 
hatchery intake waters during a period of natural pH fluctuation). 
8. Id. at 703. 
9. When CO2 in the atmosphere mixes with seawater, it triggers a chemical reaction that makes 
the oceans more acidic. Because human activity releases CO2—known as “anthropogenic” CO2—
into the atmosphere, human pollution is a contributing factor to ocean acidification. Oceans have 
absorbed more than thirty percent of the anthropogenic CO2 emitted since the beginning of the 
industrial era; during that time, the ocean surface has become significantly more acidic. See infra 
Section I.A. 
10. See, e.g., Elizabeth Kolbert, The Acid Sea, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC MAG. (Apr. 1, 2011), 
http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com/print/2011/04/ocean-acidification/kolbert-text [perma.cc/YM88-
69BL]; Ocean Acidification, WOODS HOLE OCEANOGRAPHY INST., 
http://www.whoi.edu/main/topic/ocean-acidification [https://perma.cc/DP5P-RJ7C] (last visited 
Mar. 9, 2015). 
11. What Is Ocean Acidification?, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., 
http://www.pmel.noaa.gov/co2/story/What+is+Ocean+Acidification%3F [https://perma.cc/99WC-
A6RA] (last visited Mar. 9, 2015) (showing the shell of a pteropod, a major food source of North 
Pacific juvenile salmon, completely dissolving after forty-five days at the pH levels projected for 
2100). 
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structures.
12
 
Although ocean acidification is a global problem, this Comment 
focuses on acidification in the context of the Pacific Northwest. This 
region is uniquely vulnerable to acidification, in part because losses to 
fish and shellfish harvests could significantly impact the regional 
economy—shellfish aquaculture alone represents over $100 million in 
annual regional revenue.
13
 The Pacific Northwest is also home to a 
number of fish and shellfish-dependent Native American tribes, 
including the Swinomish, the Makah, and the Suquamish.
14
 These 
coastal tribes may be disproportionately impacted by acidification due to 
their higher per capita fish consumption. Members of the Suquamish 
tribe, for example, consume up to 800 grams of fish per day,
15
 compared 
to the national average of roughly nineteen grams.
16
 Furthermore, ocean 
acidification has the potential to negatively impact tribal treaty rights, 
                                                     
12. Organisms like shellfish are often referred to as “calcifying” organisms because they use 
carbonate minerals in seawater to synthesize their shells. A meta-analysis of modern scientific 
examinations of the effects of acidification on calcifying confirmed that in general, the scientific 
community has reached a consensus: ocean acidification negatively impacts calcification, in part 
due to its negative impact on the availability of carbonate ions. See, e.g., Pauline M. Ross et al., The 
Impact of Ocean Acidification on Reproduction, Early Development and Settlement of Marine 
Organisms, 3 WATER 1005, 1010 (2011) (discussing impacts on enchinoderms and mollusks); 
K.R.N. Anthony et al., Ocean Acidification Causes Bleaching and Productivity Loss in Coral Reef 
Builders, 105 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 17442 (2008), http://www.pnas.org/ 
content/105/45/17442.full [https://perma.cc/TKL2-A7HY]. 
13. See Scigliano, supra note 1. A recent University of Oregon study estimates that ocean 
acidification has already cost the region’s shellfish industry $110 million. Press Release, Or. State 
Univ., Study outlines threat of ocean acidification to coastal communities in the U.S. (Feb. 23, 
2015), http://oregonstate.edu/ua/ncs/archives/2015/feb/study-outlines-threat-ocean-acidification-
coastal-communities-us [https://perma.cc/2QZ8-XWZT]. Globally, the estimated value of fisheries 
totals $91.2 billion; coral reef fisheries alone count for $5.7 billion. See Sarah R. Cooley et al., 
Ocean Acidification’s Potential to Alter Global Marine Ecosystem Services, OCEANOGRAPHY, Dec. 
2009, at 172, 174. 
14. See United States v. Washington, 626 F. Supp. 1405, 1528–31 (W.D. Wash. 1986) 
(discussing the importance of fish to the area’s tribes, referred to collectively as the Tulalip Tribes, 
in the context of traditional and accustomed fishing grounds); NW. INDIAN APPLIED RESEARCH 
INST., NATIVE PEOPLES: THE “MINER’S CANARY” OF CLIMATE CHANGE 9 (Debra McNutt ed., 
2008), http://nwindian.evergreen.edu/pdf/climatechangereport.pdf [https://perma.cc/J5Y9-DZAN] 
(discussing the economic and cultural importance of shellfish to tribes in the Pacific Northwest). 
15. WASH. STATE DEP’T OF ECOLOGY, PUB. NO. 12-09-058, FISH CONSUMPTION RATES, at B-3 
(2013), https://fortress.wa.gov/ecy/publications/documents/1209058.pdf [https://perma.cc/AG4S-
7UVV]. 
16. See NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., PER CAPITA CONSUMPTION 93 (2011), 
http://www.st.nmfs.noaa.gov/st1/fus/fus11/08_percapita2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/B8H3-TNGU]. 
Older government estimates are lower still, at roughly five grams per person per day. See ENVTL. 
PROT. AGENCY, ESTIMATED PER CAPITA FISH CONSUMPTION IN THE UNITED STATES vii (2002), 
http://water.epa.gov/scitech/swguidance/standards/criteria/health/upload/consumption_report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5YW9-ZPLS]. 
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aspects of tribal culture, and spiritual traditions by further depressing 
salmon and shellfish populations.
17
 
While the full extent of harm caused by ocean acidification is 
unknown, NOAA’s research shows that acidification has already 
contributed to millions of dollars in lost revenue by shellfish producers 
like the Whiskey Creek Hatchery.
18
 However, the traditional recourse in 
American law for recovering damages—the tort system—has proven to 
be an unreliable mechanism for remedying climate change-related 
harms.
19
 In short, the complexity of climate change-related harms is ill-
suited to the tort system’s rigid model of “duty, breach, . . . causation, 
and harm.”20 There is little reason to expect that the outcome would be 
any different in the context of ocean acidification. For example, a 
shellfish producer harmed by acidification might step forward to bring a 
claim. Her losses would be reasonably easy to calculate—the known 
monetary value of farmed shellfish makes it straightforward to express 
damages as a dollar amount.
21
 Nevertheless, sustaining a tort claim for 
acidification would be an uphill battle. Duty and breach, for example, 
are difficult to establish when every human alive contributes to the 
problem simply by breathing.
22
 More fundamentally, the primary cause 
of ocean acidification (excessive CO2 pollution)
23
 is far removed from 
the harm (change to seawater chemistry). Accordingly, our hypothetical 
                                                     
17. Pteropods, a type of plankton commonly known as “sea butterfly,” are a major food source of 
North Pacific juvenile salmon. Studies show that pteropod development and survival is negatively 
impacted by ocean acidification. See Washington, 626 F. Supp. at 1528–31 (discussing the 
importance of fish to the Tulalip Tribes in the context of traditional and accustomed fishing 
grounds); NW. INDIAN APPLIED RESEARCH INST., supra note 14, at 9 (discussing the economic and 
cultural importance of shellfish to tribes in the Pacific Northwest). 
18. See generally Barton et al., supra note 7 (reporting data collected from hatchery intake waters 
during a period of natural pH fluctuation); Anar Virji, The Great American Oyster Collapse, AL 
JAZEERA (Jul. 21, 2014, 10:01 GMT), http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2014/07/great-
american-oyster-collapse-2014720132433957401.html [https://perma.cc/6928-JLP7] (reporting 
losses of up to forty-two percent in Pacific oyster harvests). 
19. See, e.g., Douglas A. Kysar, What Climate Change Can Do About Tort Law, 41 ENVTL. L. 1, 
44 (2011) (summarizing the incompatibilities between tort standards for recovery and climate 
change damages). 
20. See, e.g., id. at 9. 
21. In this respect, our hypothetical claim actually avoids a challenge typical to climate torts: the 
difficulties associated with calculating damages for complex environmental harms. See Sanne H. 
Knudsen, The Long-Term Tort: In Search of a New Causation Framework for Natural Resource 
Damages, 108 NW. U.L. REV. 475 (2014) (detailing the complexities presented by long-term 
environmental harms with respect to damages calculations). 
22. Kysar, supra note 19, at 11–12, 18. 
23. A more complete discussion of the causes and consequences of ocean acidification follows in 
the next section. See infra Section I.A. 
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plaintiff is likely to find her causal burden insurmountable.
24
 The study 
of acidification is a science, and scientific conclusions about complex 
global phenomena are invariably subject to doubt, uncertainty, and 
disagreement—all of which heavily favor tort defendants.25 Tort law, as 
David Kysar observes, appears “fundamentally ill-equipped to address 
the causes and impacts of climate change.”26 
Similarly, the current political system is unlikely to provide an 
effective legislative solution to ocean acidification. Governments are 
aware of climate risks: the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) recently repeated its warning that without significant mitigation 
of global emissions, the long-term consequences of climate change 
become inevitable.
27
 The IPCC warnings depict shifting climate patterns, 
massive losses of species biodiversity, and increasingly frequent extreme 
weather events.
28
 Eighty-one percent of the American public
29
 and 
ninety-seven percent of climate scientists agree that climate change is 
real and impacted by human activity.
30
 Nevertheless, effective legislative 
engagement has yet to occur.
31
 Instead, the nation’s most senior 
                                                     
24. For example, in order to demonstrate causation, a plaintiff must prove every link in the causal 
chain. In the climate change context, this arguably leaves plaintiffs with the Herculean task of 
isolating a specific defendant’s contribution to ambient pollutants and tracking those molecules 
from the moment of emission to the moment of harm. See Kysar, supra note 19, at 3–4. 
25. Luciano Butti, The Tortuous Road to Liability: A Critical Survey on Climate Change 
Litigation in Europe and North America, SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL. J., Winter 2011, at 30, 33 
(noting that showing a one-to-one connection between a particular tortfeasor and a specific harm is 
a core tenet of tort causality—and arguably unknowable when the harm is driven by a naturally 
occurring and dispersed gas like carbon dioxide); see also infra Section I.A. 
26. Kysar, supra note 19, at 6. 
27. Christopher B. Field et al., Summary for Policymakers, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: IMPACTS, 
ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY 1, 14 (2014), http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-
report/ar5/wg2/ar5_wgII_spm_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/G5EP-QVBW]. 
28. Id. 
29. Coral Davenport & Marjorie Connelly, Most Republicans Say They Back Climate Action, Poll 
Finds, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/31/us/politics/most-
americans-support-government-action-on-climate-change-poll-finds.html [https://perma.cc/HLD7-
FNBX] (reporting on recent polling conducted jointly by the New York Times, Stanford University, 
and the nonpartisan research group Resources for the Future). 
30. Scientific Consensus: Earth’s Climate Is Warming, NAT’L AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN., 
http://climate.nasa.gov/scientific-consensus/ [https://perma.cc/4QRU-U24R] (last visited Feb. 7, 
2016). The IPCC’s comprehensive review of climate change further concludes “[i]t is extremely 
likely that human influence has been the dominant cause of the observed warming since the mid-
20th century.” Field at al., supra note 27, at 3 n.1. 
31. For example, the most ambitious federal legislative response to ocean acidification, the 
Federal Ocean Acidification Research and Monitoring Act of 2009, takes no substantive steps to 
mitigate acidification. Omnibus Federal Lands Management Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111–11, 
§§ 12401–12409, 123 Stat. 991, 1441–42; see also NOAA OA Plan, NOAA PMEL CARBON 
PROGRAM, http://www.pmel.noaa.gov/co2/story/NOAA+OA+Plan [https://perma.cc/JQF4-RL72] 
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legislative body appears to be in “climate change denial”: the Senate 
recently voted down a non-binding resolution simply recognizing that 
climate change exists and is human-influenced.
32
 Given the lackluster 
governmental response to climate change in general, a legislative 
solution to ocean acidification (a newer, less understood manifestation of 
broader climate change) seems unlikely. 
The tort system’s incompatibility and the political system’s 
incapacitation indicate that ocean health advocates should look for 
remedies in existing environmental laws. Many of these statutes date 
back to the pro-environment legislative era of the 1970s—the challenge 
is thus to apply the laws of yesterday to the ocean acidification crisis of 
today.
33
 This Comment argues that our nation’s most powerful water 
quality law, the Clean Water Act (CWA),
34
 is the best available tool for 
ocean acidification mitigation. In particular, this Comment demonstrates 
that modernizing the CWA’s water quality standards (§ 303) could bring 
ocean acidification within the Act’s regulatory scope. Waters already 
burdened by acidification would fail modern, scientifically defensible 
water quality standards.
35
 Under the requirements of the Act, impacted 
waters would then be listed as “impaired” under CWA § 303(d). This 
impairment finding would, in turn, trigger the statutory obligation to 
develop a TMDL for acidification.
36
 Because TMDLs focus on holistic 
water quality, they require regulation of both point and non-point (i.e., 
diffuse) sources of pollution—thereby providing the legal authority and 
regulatory framework necessary to address the diffuse carbon sources 
contributing to ocean acidification.
37
 However, TMDL-based strategies 
may be undermined by poor non-point source enforcement. 
Nevertheless, in the specific context of acidification-impacted waters in 
the Pacific Northwest, this Comment argues that involving local tribal 
stakeholders could bolster TMDL enforcement. 
The purpose of this Comment is not to argue that TMDLs will fix 
ocean acidification. Acidification is a global problem; it will require a 
                                                     
(last visited Jan. 28, 2016). 
32. Coral Davenport, Senate Rejects Human Role in Climate Change, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/23/us/politics/senate-rejects-human-role-in-climate-change.html 
[https://perma.cc/GW7F-Q845].  
33. See, e.g., Miyoko Sakashita, Harnessing the Potential of the Clean Water Act to Address 
Ocean Acidification, 36 ECOLOGY L. CURRENTS 239 (2009). 
34. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2012). 
35. Sakashita, supra note 33, at 242. 
36. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d). 
37. See infra note 208 and accompanying text. 
18 - LeMay.docx (Do Not Delete) 3/27/2016  3:50 PM 
2016] OUR CORROSIVE OCEANS 367 
 
global solution. This Comment argues that TMDL regulation of local 
waters should be part of that solution. Although the CWA can (and 
should) regulate airborne pollutants that impair protected waters, other 
statutes are already positioned to regulate atmospheric CO2—most 
obviously, the Clean Air Act. The strength of the CWA in this context is 
the ability of TMDLs to catalogue and regulate individual point and non-
point pollution sources. TMDLs represent the opportunity to slow or 
mitigate the impact of ocean acidification in local waters by these local 
contributors to acidification. 
Setting the stage for this analysis, Part I briefly reviews the science of 
acidification and discusses the ways in which the tort system is ill-
equipped to remedy scientifically complex harms. Given this systemic 
incompatibility, this Comment argues that regulation represents a more 
promising pathway to mitigation. Part II focuses on one such regulatory 
mechanism: the CWA. This Comment argues that meaningful ocean 
acidification regulation is within the CWA’s scope. Although the drivers 
of acidification are typically diffuse pollutants like atmospheric CO2 and 
therefore cannot be regulated by the CWA’s point source permits, the 
Act’s § 303 water quality criteria provide an avenue to regulation under 
the TMDL regime. While this Comment argues in support of TMDLs for 
acidification, it also acknowledges that TMDL regimes are often 
criticized for inadequate policing of non-point pollution sources. In 
response, Part III advances a new strategy for bolstering TMDL 
enforcement in Washington: engagement with acidification-impacted 
Native American tribes. In addition to supporting TMDL enforcement 
through political pressure, tribes party to the Stevens Treaties could 
safeguard tribal rights to fish and shellfish through treaty enforcement 
actions to enjoin specific enforcement of TMDLs for non-point 
pollutants. 
I. SCIENTIFIC COMPLEXITY AND THE INADEQUACY OF 
COMMON LAW REMEDIES 
[A]nthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions represent the 
paradigmatic anti-tort, a collective action problem so pervasive 
and so complicated as to render at once both all of us and none 
of us responsible. 
—Douglas A. Kysar38 
Environmental harms are, in a word, messy. “[D]iffuse and disparate 
                                                     
38. Kysar, supra note 19, at 4. 
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in origin, lagged and latticed in effect,”39 the injuries caused by ocean 
acidification and other aspects of climate change fit poorly into the tort 
system’s model of tortfeasor, victim, and a clear causal chain.40 Instead, 
the complexity and uncertainty surrounding these types of environmental 
harms favor defendants at each stage of the basic tort analysis: duty, 
breach, causation, and damages.
41
 
Section I.A begins by describing the uncertain state of ocean 
acidification science. Next, Section I.B discusses why, given this 
uncertainty, acidification will be difficult to remedy using the modern 
tort regime. Finally, Section I.C examines why a regulatory regime is 
better equipped to handle complex environmental harms like ocean 
acidification. 
A. Ocean Acidification: Causes and Consequences for Selected 
Species 
Any successful application of law to ocean acidification must be 
grounded in a sound understanding of the basic science.
42
 Simply put, 
ocean acidification is the process by which seawater absorbs CO2 from 
the atmosphere, triggering a chemical reaction that increases ocean 
acidity.
43
 This reaction has two key consequences: first, the combination 
of H2O and CO2 “consumes” a carbonate ion (CO3
2-
 ),
44
 which reduces 
the bioavailability of calcium carbonate (CaCO3) minerals that oysters 
and other so-called “calcifying” organisms use to construct their shells 
and skeletal structures.
45
 Second, the reaction decreases the pH of 
seawater.
46
 By breaking the bonds of water molecules (H2O), the 
                                                     
39. Id. 
40. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 281, 328A (1965) (outlining the 
elements of a tort). 
41. Id. 
42. See Aurora Janke & Marcus Pearson, Breaking the Surface of Ocean Acidification: A 
Discussion of Science, Law, and Policy 6 (Spring 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with 
Washington Law Review) (“Any successful ocean acidification solution, whether through law or 
policy, must rely on sound science.”).  
43. See, e.g., Doney et al., supra note 4; Richard A. Feely et al., Uptake and Storage of Carbon 
Dioxide in the Ocean: The Global CO2 Survey, OCEANOGRAPHY, Dec. 2001, at 18; What Is Ocean 
Acidification?, supra note 11. Globally, oceans absorb roughly 3.2 gigatons of carbon dioxide per 
year—far surpassing the rate of uptake at the beginning of the industrial era. See Peter Tans, An 
Accounting of the Observed Increase in Oceanic and Atmospheric CO2 and an Outlook for the 
Future, OCEANOGRAPHY, Dec. 2009, at 26, 26. Scientists expect this rate increase further as CO2 
levels continue to rise and terrestrial carbon sinks become saturated. Id. at 32. 
44. Doney et al., supra note 4, at 172. 
45. See id. at 170.  
46. See, e.g., Cooley et al., supra note 13, at 172–73. 
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acidification reaction releases some of the component hydrogen (H
+
) as 
“free” hydrogen ions into the water.47 In other words, by absorbing CO2, 
oceans increase the concentration of hydrogen ions in seawater; more 
hydrogen ions in seawater means a lower ocean pH.
48
 Seawater with a 
lower pH is more acidic.
49
 
 
Figure 1: Absorbing CO2 Reduces Ocean pH 
 
 
The two consequences of acidification, decreased carbonate ion 
saturation and increased seawater pH, each present risks to marine 
organisms. First, reducing the availability of carbonate ions in the water 
deprives “calcifying” organisms—including species of oyster, coral, and 
plankton—of an essential mineral.50 Calcifying species use calcium 
carbonate to construct their shells or skeletal structures.
51
 Because ocean 
acidification reduces the amount of carbonate available to these 
organisms, scientists believe calcifying species are particularly 
                                                     
47. Tans, supra note 43, at 34. 
48. Id. The pH scale measures from zero (pure acid) to fourteen (pure alkaline). pH is the 
negative logarithm of hydrogen ions (H+) in water; as hydrogen ion concentration increases, acidity 
goes up and pH goes down. 
49. Id.  
50. Id.; see also Ross et al., supra note 12, at 1008. 
51. Tans, supra note 43, at 34; see also Ross et al., supra note 12, at 1008. 
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vulnerable to acidification.
52
 Furthermore, shells made of calcium 
carbonate are water soluble.
53
 Therefore, even if these organisms do 
form shells, they may be weakened, malformed, or dissolved by 
increasingly corrosive seawater.
54
 
Although ocean acidification’s potential to harm calcifying organisms 
is not fully understood, there are known risks for at least two thoroughly 
studied species: the Pacific oyster and pteropods. The Pacific oyster is a 
mainstay of the Pacific Northwest’s shellfish industry.55 In 2007, 
millions of oyster larvae deaths
56
 on the Washington and Oregon coasts 
coincided with a seasonal upwelling event that naturally reduced the pH 
of local waters.
57
 Scientists hypothesized that acidification killed the 
oyster larvae.
58
 Subsequent real-world testing confirmed that low pH 
negatively impacts Pacific oyster larvae survival.
59
 Twenty-four hours 
after fertilization, eighty percent of Pacific oyster gametes in reduced pH 
water displayed malformed shells—or had formed no shell at all.60 
Outside the laboratory, seasonal upwelling events bring water that is 
sufficiently acidic to cause nearly one-hundred percent larval mortality.
61
 
Nor are the impacts limited to larvae: for example, scientists also believe 
that acidification negatively impacts reproduction, and juvenile oysters 
exhibited a ten percent decrease in shell formation and growth rate under 
experimental conditions.
62
 
Another closely studied organism is the pteropod (colloquially known 
as the “sea butterfly”), a type of calcifying plankton.63 Plankton are an 
                                                     
52. See Ross et al., supra note 12, at 1006 (noting the particular impact on marine organisms at 
the larval stage). 
53. See, e.g., Doney et al., supra note 4; Feely et al., supra note 43; What Is Ocean 
Acidification?, supra note 11. 
54. See generally Ross et al., supra note 12 (surveying scientific studies demonstrating the 
negative effects of ocean acidification on calcifying organisms, including various shellfish and sea 
urchin species at the larval stage). 
55. Scigliano, supra note 1. 
56. See Craig Welch, Acidity Killed NW Oysters, New Study Says, SEATTLE TIMES (Apr. 11, 
2012, 10:45 PM), http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/acidity-in-ocean-killed-nw-oysters-
new-study-says/ [https://perma.cc/P55Q-B9GH]; Virji, supra note 18 (reporting further significant 
losses of Pacific oysters by shellfish farmers in succeeding years). 
57. See Scigliano, supra note 1. An “upwelling event” refers to a natural mixing of colder water 
from deeper in the ocean with coastal water. Because deep ocean water tends to be more acidic, 
upwellings may increase the acidity of coastal waters. Id. 
58. Barton et al., supra note 7, at 699. 
59. Id. 
60. Kurihara et al., supra note 6, at 96. 
61. See Barton et al., supra note 7, at 706. 
62. Doney et al., supra note 4, at 177. 
63. What Is Ocean Acidification?, supra note 11 (showing the shells of pteropods completely 
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irreplaceable component of the marine food web,
64
 and pteropods are no 
exception—they are a key prey species for organisms ranging from krill 
to whales.
65
 Pteropods are also a major food source for North Pacific 
juvenile salmon.
66
 Like the Pacific oyster, pteropods rely on the 
availability of carbonate minerals to form their protective shells.
67
 
However, studies suggest that pteropods’ shells may be particularly 
vulnerable to corrosion—their shells exhibit microscopic “scoring” at 
current levels of acidity, and dissolve completely when exposed to the 
projected ocean pH for the year 2100.
68
 It is important to remember that 
even as their shells dissolve, pteropods are simultaneously less able to 
synthesize new shell material because the acidification reaction reduces 
the bioavailability of shell-forming minerals.
69
 Given the significance of 
these organisms to the marine food web in general—and their 
importance to salmon specifically
70—the apparent vulnerability of 
pteropods to ocean acidification is cause for grave concern.
71
 
B. Scientific Uncertainty Pervades the Study of Ocean Acidification 
Despite scientists’ growing awareness of the danger ocean 
acidification poses to select species, the global threat remains poorly 
                                                     
dissolving at the pH levels projected for 2100). 
64. See, e.g., WALKER SMITH ET AL., VA. INST. OF MARINE SCI., MARINE PLANKTON FOOD WEBS 
AND CLIMATE CHANGE (2008), http://estuaries.noaa.gov/teachers/pdf/ 
Plankton_Food_Webs_VIMS.pdf [https://perma.cc/7LBJ-BUHF]. 
65. Steve Comeau et al., Response of the Arctic Pteropod Limacina Helicina to Projected Future 
Environmental Conditions, PLOS ONE, June 2010, at 1, 
http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0011362 [https://perma.cc/BEQ6-
U5AB]. 
66. Id. 
67. See generally M. Debora Iglesias-Rodriguez et al., Phytoplankton Calcification in a High-
CO2 World, 320 SCIENCE 336 (2008). 
68. What Is Ocean Acidification?, supra note 11 (showing the shell of pteropods completely 
dissolving at the pH levels projected for 2100). The particular vulnerability of pteropod shells to 
ocean acidification is likely because of the type of calcium carbonate that pteropods synthesize to 
construct their shell material: aragonite. Compared to other forms of the mineral, aragonite is 
unusually water soluble (i.e., prone to dissolving). Victoria J. Fabry et al., Impacts of Ocean 
Acidification on Marine Fauna and Ecosystem Processes, 65 ICES J. MARINE SCI. 414, 423–24 
(2008). 
69. Fabry et al., supra note 68, at 417. This parallels the reduced ability to synthesize shell 
material observed in juvenile Pacific oysters in low pH conditions. See Doney et al., supra note 4, at 
177. 
70. Salmon, in their own right, also exhibit vulnerabilities to significantly low pH scenarios. See, 
e.g., W.D. Watter et al., Evidence of Acidification of Some Nova Scotian Rivers and Its Impact on 
Atlantic Salmon, Salmo Salar, 40 CAN. J. FISHERIES & AQUATIC SCI. 462, 472 (1983). 
71. Janke & Pearson, supra note 42. 
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understood.
72
 Acidification science involves the measurement of gradual 
changes, often spanning decades, across the world’s oceans.73 Given the 
scale of the phenomenon, many of scientists’ remaining questions will 
require years of study to answer.
74
 Our incomplete understanding of 
acidification is also partially the result of funding limitations, which 
often prevent replication of laboratory experiments under real-world 
conditions.
75
 Even where research has produced reliable data, those 
findings may not be generally applicable. For example, there is no 
guarantee that research into one organism’s acidification tolerance will 
shed light on the tolerance of other species.
76
 As ocean researcher Scott 
Doney observed, the fact that most research results stem from species-
specific laboratory experiments means that “the response of individual 
organisms, populations, and communities to more realistic gradual 
changes is largely unknown.”77 
Furthermore, other contributors to acidification represent potential 
confounding variables to any acidification analysis. While there is broad 
scientific consensus that CO2 pollution is the primary cause of 
acidification,
78
 the amount of CO2 a waterbody absorbs is not the only 
factor that determines its pH.
79
 This calculation is particularly complex 
in coastal waters. For example, in the Pacific Northwest, near-shore 
waters become (temporarily) more acidic during seasonal upwelling 
events. An “upwelling” refers to the natural mixing of colder, deep 
ocean water with coastal waters.
80
 The deep water brings with it 
                                                     
72. Doney et al., supra note 4, at 184. 
73. Id. 
74. Id. 
75. Id.; Janke & Pearson, supra note 42. 
76. Fabry et al., supra note 68, at 423–24 (summarizing results of studies analyzing responses of 
different marine fauna to acidification: North Sea jellyfish exhibited no negative impact from a pH 
drop of 8.3 to 8.1; sea bass survived at a pH of 7.25 but fed less frequently; the Greenlip abalone 
survived at a pH of 7.39 but grew at a reduced rate). 
77. Doney et al., supra note 4, at 184. 
78. Id. 
79. See, e.g., Claudine Hauri et al., Ocean Acidification in the California Current System, 
OCEANOGRAPHY, Dec. 2009, at 61, 66 (discussing the relationship between nutrient loading and 
acidity). 
80. Coastal currents in the Pacific Ocean off the coasts of Washington and Oregon drive 
upwellings on a seasonal basis. Thus, upwellings must be added to the list of potential contributors 
to coastal acidification. Furthermore, upwellings demonstrate that an acidification model developed 
for coastal waters may not apply to deep water, and vice versa. See, e.g., Katherine E. Harris et al., 
Aragonite Saturation State Dynamics in a Coastal Upwelling Zone, 40 GEOPHYSICAL RES. LETTERS 
2720, 2722–24 (2013) (noting that coastal upwelling events cause variation in pH levels and the 
structural minerals relied on by some calcifying organisms); Hauri et al., supra note 79, at 66. 
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nutrients that contribute to the incredible productivity and biodiversity of 
the waters off Washington’s coasts;81 however, because deep water also 
tends to be more acidic, these nutrients come at the cost of a natural 
spike in acidity.
82
 
Indirectly, the nutrients themselves also contribute to acidification.
83
 
In agricultural areas, fertilizer and other terrestrial runoff artificially 
increase the amount of nutrients in the water.
84
 Thus, both agricultural 
runoff and upwelling events may elevate nutrient loads in coastal 
waters.
85
 High nutrient loads, in turn, drive phytoplankton blooms—and 
when the bloom subsides, the dead phytoplankton sink and decompose.
86
 
Decomposing organic matter releases CO2 into the water, further 
increasing its acidity.
87
 This discussion of seasonal upwelling and 
nutrient loads serves as a reminder that atmospheric CO2 is not the only 
driver of ocean acidification—local factors contribute to acidification in 
specific waterbodies as well. It may not always be possible to isolate the 
impact of one driver of acidification from the other causes. 
Even assuming the causes of acidification can be isolated, however, it 
may still be difficult to identify whether acidification was the sole cause 
of a given harm. For example, in addition to being acidic, coastal water 
might also exhibit high temperature
88
 or low dissolved oxygen (DO).
89
 
Temperature, DO, and pH all factor into how hostile or hospitable 
marine organisms find their environment.
90
 Given a singular harm—a 
shellfish farmer’s loss of oyster larvae, for example, or a crop of 
undersized oysters with malformed shells—it is not always clear which 
factor (or combination of factors) is at fault.
91
 
                                                     
81. See, e.g., Nutrient Pollution of Coastal Waters—Too Much of a Good Thing, NCCOS NEWS 
& FEATURES (Jan. 26, 2008), http://coastalscience.noaa.gov/news/coastal-pollution/nutrient-
pollution-of-coastal-waters-too-much-of-a-good-thing/ [https://perma.cc/YV9J-J88B]. 
82. Hauri et al., supra note 79, at 66. 
83. See, e.g., Nutrient Pollution of Coastal Waters—Too Much of a Good Thing, supra note 81. 
84. See, e.g., id. 
85. See, e.g., id. 
86. See, e.g., id. 
87. Hauri et al., supra note 79, at 66. 
88. See, e.g., Ross et al., supra note 12, at 1015. 
89. See, e.g., Ryan B. Wallace et al., Coastal Ocean Acidification: The Other Eutrophication 
Problem, 148 ESTUARINE, COASTAL & SHELF SCI. 1 (2014); NAT. OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC 
ADMIN., STATE OF THE COAST REPORT: OXYGEN DEPLETION IN COASTAL WATERS (1998), 
http://oceanservice.noaa.gov/websites/retiredsites/sotc_pdf/HYP.PDF [https://perma.cc/VG8B-
6524]. 
90. See, e.g., Wallace et al., supra note 89; Nutrient Pollution of Coastal Waters—Too Much of a 
Good Thing, supra note 81. 
91. Id. 
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C. The Scientific Uncertainty Associated with Ocean Acidification 
Precludes an Effective Tort Response 
Despite many unanswered questions, there is a growing consensus 
within the scientific community that ocean acidification poses serious 
risks to marine organisms and ecology.
92
 However, from a legal 
perspective, the existence of uncertainty is an early indication that tort 
law is unlikely to provide an adequate remedy for acidification-related 
harms.
93
 While problems arise at each stage of an ocean acidification tort 
analysis—duty, breach, and causation—the scope and complexity of 
ocean acidification makes proving causation particularly difficult.
94
 
The first step in a tort analysis—defining “due care”—is complicated 
by global responsibility for CO2 pollution. The baseline assumption in 
tort law is that “every person owes a duty of ordinary care to all 
others.”95 In the acidification context, due care might mean forbearing 
from actions that contribute to acidification. An immediate issue arises: 
given that acidification is driven by atmospheric CO2, every person on 
earth “breaches” due care (i.e., contributes to the harm) simply by 
breathing.
96
 In response, some have argued that “duty” in the climate 
change context should be reinterpreted as only the “duty to not pollute 
unsustainably.”97 According to the United Nations, this would require 
each person in the developed world to stay within a “carbon budget” of 
2.7 tons of CO2 per year.
98
 Even assuming this is a practical possibility,
99
 
the problem of scope remains: the millions of people and corporations 
                                                     
92. See, e.g., Doney et al., supra note 4. 
93. See, e.g., Kysar, supra note 19, at 3–4 (“Built as it is on a paradigm of harm in which A 
wrongfully, directly, and exclusively injures B, tort law seems fundamentally ill-equipped to 
address the causes and impacts of climate change . . . .”). 
94. See, e.g., id. 
95. W. Jonathan Cardi & Michael D. Green, Duty Wars, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 671, 671 n.1 (2008); 
see also David A. Weisbach, Negligence, Strict Liability, and Responsibility for Climate Change, 97 
IOWA L. REV. 521 (2012) (discussing an alternative approach, the adoption of a modified strict 
liability standard, being tentatively explored in Europe).  
96. See Kysar, supra note 19, at 17–19. 
97. See id. at 18 (describing these polluters and others as “choke points” in the anthropogenic 
carbon cycle). 
98. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 
107, 31 I.L.M. 849, 851; Kysar, supra note 19, at 51 (noting the 2.7 ton per year threshold as the 
highest per capita emission level possible without exceeding the two degrees Celsius global 
warming “tipping point” for catastrophic climate change). 
99. Because 2.7 tons of CO2 emissions is equivalent to driving a standard car for ten weeks, or 
taking a single roundtrip flight from San Francisco to New York, it seems unlikely that even 
conscientious Americans would be able to meet this target. See Kysar, supra note 19, at 51. 
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likely to exceed this budget would result in an impractically large 
defendant pool. One response might be to further limit liability at the 
proximate cause stage, enforcing breaches of due care against only the 
largest polluters: fossil fuel companies, electric utilities, and motor 
vehicle manufacturers.
100
 This list should arguably include federal and 
state governments as well.
101
 Nevertheless, even if plaintiffs are able to 
clear these breach and proximate cause hurdles, significant problems 
remain at the causation stage. 
The complexity of acidification science makes the plaintiff’s duty to 
prove causation unreasonably difficult.
102
 Under most circumstances, 
tort plaintiffs must demonstrate a connection between their 
particularized harm and the alleged tortfeasor’s actions.103 However, in 
the case of climate change, “cause” is far removed from “effect.” Ocean 
acidification is no exception: once emitted into the atmosphere, CO2 
does not travel directly to the patch of ocean it will eventually acidify.
104
 
The variables mentioned in Section I.B, such as high nutrient loading or 
separate water quality issues like low levels of DO, represent potential 
intervening causes of the plaintiff’s harm. More fundamentally, the 
study of ocean acidification is a science; uncertainty is a part of science. 
In this case, and despite advances in scientists’ understanding in recent 
years, the remaining scientific uncertainty heavily favors the defendant 
in any tort suit. 
                                                     
100. Id. at 18 (describing these polluters and others as “choke points” in the anthropogenic carbon 
cycle). 
101. For example, in 2010 the federal government emitted 495,546 million tons of CO2 (or CO2 
equivalent)—excluding all military and law enforcement emissions. See FY2010 Federal 
Government Greenhouse Gas Inventory by Agency, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
https://catalog.data.gov/dataset/fy2010-federal-government-greenhouse-gas-inventory-by-agency 
[https://perma.cc/3GH4-3RSG] (last visited Feb. 20, 2015). 
102. See David A. Weisbach, Negligence, Strict Liability, and Responsibility for Climate Change, 
97 IOWA L. REV. 521, 557–58 (2012); Kysar, supra note 19, at 29–32. 
103. Absent this clear relationship, plaintiffs would be forced to fall back on either a market share 
theory (rarely applied outside the medical drugs context) or a risk-increase theory (which generally 
would require plaintiffs to prove that the polluter’s emissions more than doubled the risk of the 
plaintiff’s harm) in order to connect the broken links in the causal chain. See Albert C. Lin, Beyond 
Tort: Compensating Victims of Environmental Toxic Injury, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 1439, 1449–50 
(2005) (discussing the limitations of the risk-increase theory); Kysar, supra note 19, at 37 
(advocating for several liability over the market share theory); Weisbach, supra note 102, at 557–
58. 
104. Diffuse atmospheric CO2 travels from air to water through “atmospheric deposition,” which 
models the process by which airborne pollutants, such as mercury or CO2, fall into the water—in 
rain, dust, or simply due to gravity. See Impaired Waters and Mercury, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
http://www.epa.gov/tmdl/impaired-waters-and-mercury [https://perma.cc/RZJ5-S3NV] (last visited 
Feb. 23, 2015) [hereinafter EPA TMDLs]. 
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II. APPLICATION OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT TO OCEAN 
ACIDIFICATION 
If the common law tort system is not equipped to effectively address 
the problem of acidification, stakeholders must look to alternatives: for 
example, existing environmental and pollution control regimes. This 
Comment argues that America’s most comprehensive water quality law, 
the CWA,
105
 provides an existing regulatory framework that can be 
modified to address ocean acidification. In particular, modernizing the 
CWA’s outdated water quality standards for acidity could bring ocean 
acidification within the regulatory scope of the Act.
106
 Updating water 
quality standards in order to list acidification-burdened waters as 
“impaired” under CWA § 303(d) would, in turn, trigger the statutory 
requirement to regulate these waters under a TMDL regime.
107
 A TMDL 
for acidification, at minimum, represents a regulatory framework from 
which to approach the complex task of ocean acidification regulation.
108
 
The provisions contained within the CWA
109
 offer the possibility of 
meaningful acidification regulation.
110
 Acidity itself is already classified 
as a pollutant under the CWA and is therefore within the regulatory 
scope of the Act.
111
 Nevertheless, any comprehensive regulation of 
ocean acidification must address acidification’s primary driver: 
excessive levels of anthropogenic CO2. In this respect, acidification fits 
                                                     
105. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 
(codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1357 (2012)); see also William L. Andreen, Success 
and Backlash: The Remarkable (Continuing) Story of the Clean Water Act, J. ENERGY & ENVTL. L., 
Winter 2013, at 25, 26, http://groups.law.gwu.edu/jeel/ArticlePDF/4-1-Andreen.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/WF8B-WRCE] (summarizing the CWA’s development and significance). 
106. See, e.g., Sakashita, supra note 33. 
107. See, e.g., id. 
108. Total Maximum Daily Loads (TMDLs), while arguably an important path towards effective 
ocean acidification regulation, may not be the entire answer. See Oliver A. Houck, TMDLs, Are We 
There Yet?: The Long Road Toward Water Quality-Based Regulation Under the Clean Water Act, 
27 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,389, 10,399–400 (1997) (noting poor TMDL enforcement with respect to 
non-point sources); infra Part III (suggesting a possible role for Stevens Treaties tribes in improving 
TMDL enforcement). 
109. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (outlining the water quality standards regime); id. § 1342(a) 
(outlining the NPDES permitting scheme). Because the focus of this paper is the potential for 
application of CWA water quality standards to ocean acidification, the author treats CWA § 401 
certification as outside the scope. 
110. See, e.g., Sakashita, supra note 33.  
111. See Clean Water Act (CWA): Overview of CWA, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
http://www.epa.gov/agriculture/lcwa.html [https://perma.cc/LJE2-5WT9] (last visited Mar. 12, 
2015). 
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uncomfortably within the CWA’s jurisdiction: navigable waters.112 
Ocean acidification is a water quality problem driven by air pollution.
113
 
In this sense, Congress’s jurisdictional distinction—that the CWA 
presides over water, the Clean Air Act over the air, etc.—is hopelessly 
impractical. Cross-media pollution demands cross-media regulation.
114
 
To fulfill its mandate, the CWA must reach beyond the water. Because 
the primary driver of ocean acidification is atmospheric CO2,
115
 holistic 
acidification regulation requires the CWA to limit atmospheric CO2 
emissions into the air.
116
 
To better explore the applicability of the CWA to acidification, Part II 
begins with a review of the relevant statutory provisions. Next, this 
Comment argues that the CWA, as currently written, confers to the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) the authority to regulate ocean 
acidification. However, regulating acidification would require updating 
the Act’s antiquated water quality standards for acidity. Modern 
standards would lead to acidification-burdened waters being listed as 
“impaired” under CWA § 303(d), which would trigger the requirement 
to promulgate a TMDL for the impaired waters. As this Comment 
acknowledges, TMDLs are often poorly enforced with respect to non-
point sources. Accordingly, Part II concludes by briefly summarizing the 
TMDL enforcement critique, and recognizing that this legacy of 
uncertain non-point source regulation suggests that some additional 
mechanism is needed to bolster enforcement.
117
 
A. Section 303 of the Clean Water Act Is the Most Applicable 
Regulatory Regime to Ocean Acidification 
Congress created the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, better 
known as the Clean Water Act, to “restore and maintain the chemical, 
physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”118 Within this 
                                                     
112. This is true with respect primarily to airborne CO2. Other drivers of acidification, such as 
nutrient runoff, encounter no such awkwardness. See supra Section I.B. More importantly, TMDLs 
for mercury demonstrate that the CWA can “reach the air” under certain circumstances. 
113. See, e.g., Sakashita, supra note 33. 
114. Id. 
115. CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS ON OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW: U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVES 28 (Randall S. Abate ed., 2015) [hereinafter CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS ON OCEAN 
AND COASTAL LAW]. 
116. Id. at 38–41. 
117. This Comment advances the argument that in the Pacific Northwest, tribal rights under the 
Stevens Treaties represent a compelling option. See infra Part III. 
118. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2012). 
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broad mandate, Congress directed the EPA to protect “water quality 
which provides for the protection and propagation of fish, shellfish, and 
wildlife.”119 Accordingly, the CWA includes two primary regulatory 
mechanisms: the National Pollution Discharge Elimination System 
(NPDES)
120
 and the § 303 Water Quality Standards (WQS).
121
 Although 
often treated as separate regimes, the NPDES scheme and the WQS are 
actually complementary mechanisms: the NPDES imposes effluent 
limitations on specific point source polluters, while water quality 
standards allow management of smaller point and non-point sources that 
might otherwise escape regulation.
122
 Of these two mechanisms, 
however, only § 303 is likely applicable to ocean acidification.
123
 
1. NPDES Permits Are Inapplicable to CO2 Regulation Because 
Atmospheric CO2 Is Not Delivered to Water from a “Point Source” 
The NPDES creates a permitting requirement for each lawful (1) 
discharge of (2) a pollutant into (3) protected waters.
124
 To qualify as a 
“discharge,” a point source (a “discernible, confined and discrete 
conveyance”) must deliver the pollutant to jurisdictional waters.125 
Regardless of the harm a pollutant causes to water quality, it must 
emanate from a point source to trigger the NPDES permitting 
requirement. The point source provision thus limits the program’s 
scope—a regulator may not utilize NPDES to control a known pollutant 
flowing into jurisdictional waters until she has identified a point source 
that “delivers” that pollutant to the water.126 
The point source provision most likely renders the NPDES regime 
inapplicable to ocean acidification. Even though acidity is a pollutant 
regulated by the CWA,
127
 and coastal waters are jurisdictional,
128
 the 
                                                     
119. Id. 
120. See id. § 1342(a)(1). 
121. See id. § 1313(a)–(c). This Comment’s focus is § 303’s capacity to address non-point air 
pollution; due to length concerns, the author treats CWA § 401 certification as outside the scope. 
122. EPA v. Cal. ex rel. State Water Res. Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 205 n.12 (1976). 
123. See generally Sakashita, supra note 33. 
124. Id. 
125. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14). 
126. See, e.g., Kristin Carden, Comment, South Florida Water Management District v. 
Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 28 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 549 (2004) (observing that the Supreme 
Court’s mechanical consideration of the point source definition precludes considerations of 
environmental impact and justice). The point source definition also explicitly exempts return flows 
from agriculture, § 1362(14), which contribute to coastal ocean acidification by increasing nutrient 
loads. See supra Section I.C. 
127. Clean Water Act (CWA): Overview of CWA, supra note 111 (listing pH as a conventional 
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CO2 gas that is the primary driver of acidification is not “delivered” to 
the ocean via a point source. Instead, CO2—in diffuse, gaseous form—
typically reaches the water through the slow process of atmospheric 
deposition.
129
 Therefore, even if the CO2 originates from a “discernible, 
confined and discrete conveyance”130 (such as a power plant smoke 
stack),
131
 it is delivered to seawater through indirect means.
132
 
Courts appear unwilling to tolerate even minimal “air gaps” between 
the point of emission and the point of entry into water.
133
 For example, 
in Alaska Community Action on Toxics v. Aurora Energy Services, 
LLC,
134
 the U.S. District Court for the District of Alaska addressed 
whether pollutants blown from a coal dust pile into a nearby bay could 
be subject to NPDES permitting requirements. The court held that the 
dust was exempt from NPDES because “coal blown into the Bay as 
airborne dust is not a point source discharge.”135 While the court readily 
identified the coal dust pile as the source of the pollutant,
136
 it was not a 
“point source” as understood in the CWA context because it did not 
deliver the dust directly to the water.
137
 A “no air gap” rule seems 
implicit to the court’s analysis. Even though the dust floated only a short 
distance, the court did not consider air to qualify as a “confined and 
discrete conveyance.”138 In a parallel case, Chemical Weapons Working 
Group, Inc. v. United States Dep’t of the Army,139 the Tenth Circuit was 
more direct: “common sense dictates that [smoke] stack emissions 
constitute discharges into the air—not water—and are therefore beyond 
                                                     
pollutant under the CWA). 
128. The CWA protects navigable waters, including coastal oceans. See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7); 
Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 732 (2006). 
129. See EPA TMDLs, supra note 104. 
130. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14). 
131. See, e.g., Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks: 1990–2012, ENVTL. 
PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/usinventoryreport.html 
[https://perma.cc/LC5B-EL4Q] (last visited May 20, 2015). 
132. See CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS ON OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW, supra note 115, at 50. 
133. See, e.g., Alaska Cmty. Action on Toxics v. Aurora Energy Servs., LLC, 940 F. Supp. 2d 
1005, 1022 (D. Alaska 2013). 
134. 940 F. Supp. 2d 1005 (D. Alaska 2013), rev’d on other grounds, 765 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 
2014). 
135. Id. at 1022. 
136. In fact, the court clarified that the coal dust pile would indeed be subject to regulation under 
the NPDES program if the pollutants traveled via confined conveyance from pile to water. See id. 
137. See id. at 1022. 
138. Id. at 1023. 
139. Chem. Weapons Working Grp., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Army, 111 F.3d 1485 (10th Cir. 
1997). 
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§ 301(f)’s reach.”140 These cases strongly suggest that the NPDES point 
source requirement renders § 301 inapplicable to the diffuse atmospheric 
CO2 driving ocean acidification.
141
 
2. The CWA’s Water Quality Standards Regime Is a Better Fit for 
Regulating Ocean Acidification 
In contrast with the NPDES scheme, the CWA’s § 303 WQS regime 
should apply to ocean acidification.
142
 NPDES focuses on reducing the 
effluent discharges of discreet polluters; § 303 aims to protect the overall 
quality of jurisdictional waters.
143
 Accordingly, the regulatory “reach” of 
the standards encompasses small or diffuse sources of pollution that 
might otherwise go unregulated.
144
 Ocean acidification, as a water 
quality issue primarily caused by the aggregate impact of diffuse CO2 
pollution, sits squarely within the purview of § 303.
145
 
Section 303 of the CWA requires states to promulgate three types of 
water quality standards: numeric standards, narrative standards, and 
designated uses.
146
 States first establish the designated uses for a given 
waterbody, which refers to both human uses (e.g., recreation) and natural 
uses (e.g., fish habitat and breeding grounds).
147
 Next, the responsible 
entity promulgates numerical standards (the maximum acceptable load 
of each pollutant in a given waterway) and narrative criteria that protect 
the continued enjoyment of the designated uses.
148
 In order to achieve 
this goal, is it important that the water quality standards are “based on 
the latest scientific information.”149 
                                                     
140. Id. at 1490. 
141. A possible counterargument may be found in pesticides cases, in which courts have held that 
helicopters spraying pesticides onto water are “point sources”—despite the air gap. These cases are 
distinguishable, first because the air gaps are arguably de minimis, and more importantly, because 
the spraying equipment used differs from a source like a smoke stack because it was designed for 
the specific purpose of delivering pollutants to water. See Peconic Baykeeper, Inc. v. Suffolk Cty., 
600 F.3d 180, 188–89 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that helicopters spraying mosquito-control pesticides 
were CWA point sources); League of Wilderness Defs. v. Forsgren, 309 F.3d 1181, 1185 (9th Cir. 
2002) (holding that when pesticides are sprayed directly from aircraft onto water, requirements for 
point source classification are met). 
142. See, e.g., Sakashita, supra note 33. 
143. See 33 U.S.C. § 1314(a)(1) (2012); id. § 1313(a)–(c); 40 C.F.R. § 130.3 (2015). 
144. See EPA v. Cal. ex rel. State Water Res. Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 205 n.12 (1976) 
(discussing the complementary nature of the NPDES and WQS regimes). 
145. See, e.g., Sakashita, supra note 33. 
146. See 33 U.S.C. § 1314(a)(1); id. § 1313(a)–(c); 40 C.F.R. § 130.3. 
147. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a). 
148. Id. 
149. See 40 C.F.R. § 131.10. 
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The EPA also publishes its own water quality criteria, which 
represent a “minimum bar” that state standards must meet.150 EPA 
regulations specify that, like the state standards, the EPA’s national 
“baselines” should be based on modern science.151 The EPA standards 
serve the additional purpose of making sure the agency has a continuing 
seat at the table during state-level water quality discussions. The EPA 
standards also provide the agency with leverage over state standard-
setting agencies: if the EPA updates its own standards, states must either 
adjust their water quality criteria to match, or supply a scientifically 
defensible alternative.
152
 
The argument that the CWA can “reach” ocean acidification is 
grounded in the duty § 303 imposes on states to continuously monitor 
the water quality of state waters.
153
 Under § 303(d), if a given body of 
water fails any of the water quality standards, states have the obligation 
to list that waterbody as “impaired.”154 EPA regulations also require 
states to identify the cause of impairment, identifying the “pollutants 
causing or expected to cause violations of the applicable water quality 
standard.”155 Thus, if a state like Washington were to list a stretch of its 
coastal waters as “impaired” due to ocean acidification, the state would 
have to identify CO2 as a contributing pollutant. Despite Washington’s 
active political role in the debate surrounding ocean acidification,
156
 the 
State has thus far declined to list any coastal waters as “impaired” due to 
                                                     
150. See id. § 131.11(b); 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a). 
151. See 40 C.F.R. § 131.10. 
152. See id.; Sakashita, supra note 33, at 243. Previously, the Center for Biological Diversity 
(CBD) has also unsuccessfully attempted to petition Washington and Oregon directly to include 
acidified coastal waters in their “impaired” lists under CWA § 303(d). See Complaint at 10, Ctr. for 
Biological Diversity v. U.S. EPA, 90 F. Supp. 3d 1177 (W.D. Wash. 2015) [hereinafter CBD 
Complaint]. 
153. See, e.g., Sakashita, supra note 33 (detailing the CWA application strategy for ocean 
acidification); 33 U.S.C § 1313(b)(1), (b)(3), (d). Thus, failure of the mandatory numeric, narrative 
or non-degradation standards, or the necessary for propagation baseline standard, would justify an 
“impaired” listing. See id. 
154. 33 U.S.C § 1313(b)(1), (b)(3), (d). 
155. 40 C.F.R. § 130.7(b)(4). 
156. For example, Governor Gregoire organized the 2012 Blue Ribbon Panel on Ocean 
Acidification to investigate the threat acidification poses to the state and its citizens. See generally 
WASH. STATE BLUE RIBBON PANEL ON OCEAN ACIDIFICATION, OCEAN ACIDIFICATION: FROM 
KNOWLEDGE TO ACTION SUMMARY REPORT (2012), 
http://www.ecy.wa.gov/water/marine/oa/2012report_summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y3WW-
VBCC]; see also 2012 Panel Members and Meetings, WASH. DEP’T ECOLOGY, 
http://www.ecy.wa.gov/water/marine/oa/panel.html [https://perma.cc/F27W-GBA9] (last visited 
Mar. 11, 2015) (containing written and video footage to the Panel’s meetings). 
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acidification.
157
 The EPA, for its part, approved
158
 Washington’s most 
recent impaired waters list despite this omission.
159
 
B. Modernized WQS at the State, Federal, or Qualified Tribal Level 
Could Allow TMDL Regulation of Acidification 
Water quality standards for acidity already exist under the CWA.
160
 
These standards, however, are inadequate. Near-shore coastal waters like 
those off the Washington and Oregon coasts can exhibit a pH range from 
6.5 units (slightly acidic) to nine units (alkaline) without violating the 
current standards.
161
 In the context of ocean chemistry, this “acceptable” 
pH range allowed by the CWA—a full 2.5 units—is so overbroad as to 
be almost meaningless. Recall that the 0.1 unit decrease in ocean pH 
observed since the start of the industrial era corresponds to a logarithmic 
thirty percent increase in ocean acidity.
162
 In this context, it is clear that 
the CWA’s pH standards allow for radical changes in ocean chemistry 
with no regulatory response. However, if these standards were updated 
to reflect a more modern understanding of ocean chemistry, waters 
already burdened by acidification would have to be listed as “impaired” 
waters under § 303(d), leading to a TMDL for acidification. 
1. The CWA’s Standards for Acidity, First Promulgated in 1976, Do 
Not Reflect the “Latest Science” 
The baseline standards for pH in the CWA are outdated and 
                                                     
157. Water Quality: Current EPA Approved Assessment, WASH. DEP’T ECOLOGY, 
http://www.ecy.wa.gov/programs/wq/303d/currentassessmt.html [https://perma.cc/E26E-6CYZ] 
(last visited Feb. 7, 2015) (noting that Washington’s Section 303(d) list, which does not include any 
waters impaired by acidification, was prepared in accordance with the state water quality standards, 
listed at section 173-201A of the Washington Administrative Code). 
158. The EPA is tasked with reviewing the impaired waters lists submitted by each state for 
approval. If the EPA does not approve the list, the agency has thirty days to identify waters that 
should have been listed as impaired. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(2); 40 C.F.R § 130.7(d)(2). This 
includes a public consultation requirement. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(2); 40 C.F.R § 130.7(d)(2). 
159. See Water Quality Current EPA Approved Assessment, supra note 157. 
160. See National Recommended Water Criteria, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
http://water.epa.gov/scitech/swguidance/standards/current/index.cfm#C [https://perma.cc/9W2Y-
5HH3] (last visited Mar. 20, 2015). 
161. See, e.g., WASH. STATE DEP’T OF ECOLOGY, PUB. NO. 06-10-091, WATER QUALITY 
STANDARDS FOR SURFACE WATERS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON 21 (2012) 
http://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2014-12/documents/wawqs.pdf [https://perma.cc/ENZ7-
APRR]. 
162. See Tans, supra note 43, at 34. 
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insufficient.
163
 Two WQS set out the acceptable pH ranges for CWA-
protected waters: the open ocean standard and the freshwater standard.
164
 
Both were initially promulgated in 1976.
165
 The open ocean standard sets 
6.5 to 8.5 units as an acceptable pH range, while the fresh water standard 
allows for a range of 6.5 to 9 pH units.
166
 Coastal zones, which exhibit 
natural pH variability, are evaluated according to the more flexible fresh 
water standard.
167
 
Coastal waters present a regulatory challenge due to their chemical 
complexity.
168
 Although the coastal standard’s acceptable range—6.5 to 
9 pH units
169—is even more expansive than the open ocean standard, the 
pH of near-shore water is naturally more dynamic.
170
 For example, 
seasonal upwelling events result in significant pH variations in some 
coastal waters.
171
 Nevertheless, if the CWA is to achieve Congress’s 
goal of protecting fish and shellfish,
172
 a “floor” of 6.5 pH units for 
coastal zones is dangerously tolerant of acidification.
173
 For example, 
acidification research on the Pacific oyster demonstrated impairment at a 
pH of 7.4
174—significantly less acidic than the pH of 6.5 allowed by the 
coastal WQS. Furthermore, scientists question whether WQS for coastal 
zones should include a fixed pH range at all.
175
 For example, ocean 
                                                     
163. National Recommended Water Criteria, supra note 160. 
164. Id. 
165. Id. 
166. Id. The “normal” pH of surface water in the open ocean is roughly 8.2 (slightly basic). See, 
e.g., Peter G. Brewer & James Barry, Rising Acidity in the Ocean: The Other CO2 Problem, SCI. 
AM. (Sept. 1, 2008), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/rising-acidity-in-the-ocean/ 
[https://perma.cc/D8AZ-YQMR]. With a “floor” of 6.5 pH units, the current standard thus allows 
for a radical change in ocean chemistry before requiring waters to be listed as impaired. 
Alternatively, the WQS do provide that a smaller shift in pH—if sudden—can also trigger an 
impairment finding. However, even this provision allows for a change of 0.2 pH units—roughly 
sixty percent—prior to impairment. See National Recommended Water Criteria, supra note 160. 
167. See National Recommended Water Criteria, supra note 160. 
168. Janke & Pearson, supra note 42. 
169. National Recommended Water Criteria, supra note 160. 
170. Harris et al., supra note 80, at 2720 (noting that coastal upwelling events cause variation in 
pH levels and the structural minerals relied on by some calcifying organisms). 
171. Id. 
172. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2012). 
173. Kurihara et al., supra note 6Error! Bookmark not defined., at 91 (showing negative impact 
on Pacific oyster larvae from exposure to water with a pH of 7.4 for forty-eight hours). 
174. Id. 
175. Aaron L. Strong et. al., Ocean Acidification 2.0: Managing Our Changing Coastal Ocean 
Chemistry, BIOSCIENCE, May 28, 2014, at 4 (advocating for data-based study of the drivers of pH 
change to facilitate the development of dynamic, zone-specific management practices). Others 
advocate for the promulgation of entirely new standards tracking ocean acidification indicators 
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chemistry researcher Aaron Strong advocates for a science-based 
management scheme customized to each coastal zone.
176
 Of course, 
developing a dynamic and data-driven management approach would 
complicate the regulatory process. Difficulty, however, does not justify 
inaction. 
2. States, the EPA and Certain Native American Tribes Have the 
Authority to Promulgate New WQS for Ocean Acidification 
Scientific understanding of ocean acidification has advanced since 
1976. As discussed above,
177
 agency regulations state that the WQS 
must “reflect the latest scientific knowledge.”178 The EPA and the states, 
with their forty-year-old pH standards, are currently failing this mandate. 
While each actor has the authority—and responsibility—to promulgate 
modernized WQS, for the sake of efficiency the EPA should be the “first 
mover.”179 Because the EPA’s national WQS act as a statutory 
minimum, a strengthened federal WQS obliges all responsible states to 
update their own standards to match.
180
 This is the strategy advanced by 
the Center for Biological Diversity (CBD), an organization that has 
actively advocated for water quality standards that better reflect the 
threat of ocean acidification.
181
 However, after years of EPA 
resistance,
182
 it may be time to cast a wider net. One alternate strategy 
                                                     
other than pH. See, e.g., Alexandria B. Boehm et al., Ocean Acidification Science Needs for Natural 
Resource Managers of the North American West Coast, OCEANOGRAPHY, June 2015, 170, 173, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.5670/oceanog.2015.40 [https://perma.cc/6HNN-VVTS] (advocating for a WQS 
specific to aragonite saturation). Because the state obligation to promulgate a TMDL is triggered by 
waters that fail any WQS, the scientific debate over how best to update the CWA is outside the 
scope of this Comment. 
176. See Strong et al., supra note 175, at 4; Boehm et al., supra note 175, at 173. 
177. See supra Section II.A.2. 
178. 33 U.S.C. § 1314(a)(1) (2012). 
179. See, e.g., Ctr. for Biological Diversity, Petition for Revised pH Water Quality Criteria Under 
Section 304 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1314, to Address Ocean Acidification, Before the 
EPA (Dec. 18, 2007) [hereinafter CBD Petition], http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/programs/ 
oceans/pdfs/section-304-petition-12-18-07.pdf [https://perma.cc/EE3E-UPGV]. 
180. 40 C.F.R. § 131.11(b) (2015). 
181. See, e.g., CBD Petition, supra note 179. 
182. See generally Sakashita, supra note 33. The CBD first petitioned, then sued, the EPA in 
order to compel the agency to modernize its aging WQS. See CBD Petition, supra note 179. The 
parties ultimately settled—the EPA agreed to evaluate the issue, initiated a public comment process, 
and encouraged states to update their WQS. See Press Release, Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 
Settlement Will Require EPA to Evaluate How to Regulate Ocean Acidification Under the Clean 
Water Act (Mar. 11, 2010), http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/news/press_releases/2010/ocean-
acidification-03-11-2010.html [https://perma.cc/36GN-PMHN]; Clean Water Act Section 303(d): 
Notice of Call for Public Comment on 303(d) Program and Ocean Acidification, 75 Fed. Reg. 
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might be to engage with a new type of institutional partner: selected 
Native American tribes. 
Tribes with “Treatment as a State” (TAS) status183 under the CWA 
could be powerful partners in the campaign against ocean acidification. 
Tribes have been able to petition the EPA for TAS status, which allows a 
tribe to manage CWA programs and exercise delegated authority as if it 
were a state,
184
 since 1987.
185
 CWA and EPA regulations set out four 
partially overlapping requirements that a tribe must satisfy to receive 
TAS: (1) federal recognition, (2) capacity to carry out governmental 
functions over its territory, (3) encumbrance with the governmental 
authority necessary to regulate water quality, and (4) capacity to 
administer an effective water quality program.
186
 
Once granted TAS status, a tribe is eligible to take over management 
of various CWA programs within its territory.
187
 This is a powerful tool 
for tribes, potentially including the authority to set water quality 
standards and implementation plans (§ 303), to impose conditions on 
federal permits in order to ensure compliance with tribal WQS (§ 401), 
and to issue NPDES permits (§ 402).
188
 Tribes would have the same 
powers and responsibilities as states—including the duty to promulgate 
WQS “reflecting the latest scientific knowledge.”189 Also like states, 
tribal standards can be more stringent than the federal baseline.
190
 This is 
consistent with both the exercise of inherent tribal sovereignty and the 
EPA’s interpretation of the CWA.191 
Tribal administration of CWA § 303 represents a unique opportunity 
to aim the CWA’s water quality regime squarely at the problem of ocean 
acidification. The EPA has recognized forty-nine tribes as eligible to 
                                                     
13,537, 13,537–540 (Mar. 22, 2010). However, the process resulted in no binding obligations, and 
none of the responsible parties promulgated modern standards for acidification. 
183. 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e); see also Paul M. Drucker, Wisconsin v. EPA: Tribal Empowerment 
and State Powerlessness Under § 518(e) of the Clean Water Act, 5 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 323 
(2002). 
184. 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e); see also Drucker, supra note 183. 
185. 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e). 
186. Id.; 40 C.F.R. § 131.8 (2015). 
187. 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e). 
188. See Drucker, supra note 183, at 341. 
189. 33 U.S.C. § 1314(a)(1). 
190. City of Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F.3d 415, 423 (10th Cir. 1996). 
191. Id. (“We conclude that the EPA’s construction of the 1987 amendment to the Clean Water 
Act—that tribes may establish water quality standards that are more stringent than those imposed by 
the federal government—is permissible because it is in accord with powers inherent in Indian tribal 
sovereignty.”). 
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manage the WQS program
192—fourteen of those are in EPA Region Ten, 
which includes the Pacific Northwest.
193
 Among those fourteen tribes, at 
least the Lummi,
194
 Makah,
195
 and Swinomish
196
 are potentially impacted 
by ocean acidification (because they have tidelands or coastal waters 
within their reservations). These tribes represent a nexus of relevant 
interests and authority: non-state entities with jurisdiction over coastal 
waters impacted by acidification,
197
 economic and legal interests in 
shellfish
198
 and other organisms vulnerable to ocean acidification,
199
 and 
the potential statutory authority to promulgate water quality standards 
for pH.
200
 
3. Stricter WQS Could Lead to Regulation of Ocean Acidification via 
the CWA’s TMDL Provision 
Given evidence that coastal waters in the Pacific Northwest are 
already impacted by acidification,
201
 these waters would likely fail to 
meet modern and sufficiently rigorous water quality standards for 
acidification.
202
 The CWA requires states to publish a § 303(d) 
“impaired waters” list that highlights each waterbody failing one or more 
WQS.
203
 This impairment finding triggers the statutory duty to regulate 
the pollutants responsible.
204
 Specifically, the state must establish and 
                                                     
192. Indian Tribal Approvals, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://water.epa.gov/scitech/swguidance/ 
standards/wqslibrary/approvtable.cfm [https://perma.cc/5955-BFB7] (last visited May 29, 2015). 
193. Id. 
194. A Sovereign People, LUMMI NATION, http://www.lummi-nsn.org/website/index2.html 
[https://perma.cc/V9HV-7QB4] (last visited Mar. 23, 2015) (noting that the Lummi reservation 
includes 13,000 acres of tidelands). 
195. History About the Makah and More, MAKAH TRIBE, http://makah.com/makah-tribal-info/ 
[https://perma.cc/2XED-PUZ5] (last visited May 29, 2015) (providing general information about 
the Makah tribe and its territory, abutting Neah Bay). 
196. The Swinomish People, SWINOMISH INDIAN TRIBAL CMTY., 
http://www.swinomish.org/who-we-are/the-swinomish-people.aspx [https://perma.cc/K7GY-
8MCQ] (last visited May 29, 2015) (noting that the Swinomish reservation includes 2900 acres of 
tidelands). 
197. Id. 
198. See, e.g., United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905). 
199. See supra Section I.B. 
200. See Indian Tribal Approvals, supra note 192; 33 U.S.C. § 1314(a)(1) (2012). 
201. See, e.g., Kurihara et al., supra note 6, at 91 (showing negative impact on Pacific oyster 
larvae from exposure to acidic water within currently observable pH ranges). 
202. See CBD Petition, supra note 179; CBD Complaint, supra note 152. 
203. 40 C.F.R. § 130.7(b)(1), (b)(3), (d)(2) (2015). 
204. See CBD Complaint, supra note 152. 
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enforce a TMDL for each contributing pollutant.
205
 The TMDL for a 
given pollutant is the maximum amount that can enter a waterbody each 
day.
206
 This is the heart of the CWA application theory: updated water 
quality standards, when breached, lead to mandatory TMDL regulation 
of the pollutants driving ocean acidification.
207
 
Importantly, TMDL regulation includes non-point sources of 
pollution. States calculate TMDL thresholds by examining all sources of 
pollution—both large individual point sources and smaller, diffuse non-
point sources.
208
 Limits for each pollutant contributing to impairment are 
incorporated into statewide water quality management plans.
209
 
Therefore, a TMDL for acidification could authorize state regulation of 
both point and non-point emissions.
210
 In the context of coastal ocean 
acidification, the TMDL might include drivers of acidification such as 
point and non-point releases of acidic chemicals and nutrient-rich 
agricultural runoff.
211
 In theory, the TMDL would also include CO2 
emissions, the pollutant known to be the primary cause of ocean 
acidification. 
Regulating airborne gas with a water quality statute is a pragmatic 
necessity with respect to CWA regulation of ocean acidification.
212
 It is 
likely, nevertheless, to be jurisdictionally problematic. However, there is 
precedent for CWA regulation of airborne pollutants—the CWA already 
regulates airborne mercury,
213
 polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs),
214
 and 
compounds causing acid rain.
215
 Mercury is perhaps the strongest 
example: thousands of waterbodies appear on state § 303(d) impaired 
                                                     
205. Id. 
206. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d) (2012). 
207. See, e.g., Sakashita, supra note 33, at 244. 
208. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(e); 40 C.F.R. §§ 130.6, 130.7(d)(2). 
209. 40 C.F.R. §§ 130.6, 130.7(d)(2). Specifically, state implementation plans translate the 
maximum allowable pollution load into a “pollution budget,” which is divided between local point 
sources (“wasteload allocation”) and non-point sources (“non-point source load allocation”). Id. 
§ 130.2(h). 
210. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(e); 40 C.F.R. §§ 130.6, 130.7(d)(2). 
211. See supra Section I.A.2 (discussing contributors to ocean acidification other than CO2). 
212. See generally Sakashita, supra note 33. 
213. See EPA TMDLs, supra note 104. 
214. Polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) are a class of 209 PCB isomers used in electrical 
capacitors, turbines, and other industrial applications. They are typically carcinogenic, and 
inhalation is one of the primary delivery methods. See Polychlorinated Biphenyls (PCBs), UNIV. 
NEB., http://dwb4.unl.edu/Chem/CHEM869E/CHEM869ELinks/ntp-server.niehs.nih.gov/htdocs/ 
8_RoC/RAC/PCBs.html [https://perma.cc/JB3G-N6CV] (last visited Jan. 28, 2016). 
215. See, e.g., Sakashita, supra note 33, at 244. 
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waters lists due to mercury pollution.
216
 These impairment findings 
resulted in the development of TMDLs for airborne mercury.
217
 
According to the EPA, “[i]n many waterbodies, mercury originates 
largely from air sources, such as coal-fired power plants and 
incinerators.”218 Airborne mercury reaches these waterbodies the same 
way airborne CO2 reaches the ocean: through atmospheric deposition.
219
 
TMDLs for mercury demonstrate that it is both legally and technically 
feasible to regulate airborne pollutants under the CWA.
220
 Because 
atmospheric deposition results in airborne mercury polluting water, it is 
proper—even necessary—for the CWA to “reach” into the air.221 
Mercury and CO2 are functionally analogous: both are pollutants that 
can be emitted into the atmosphere, yet pollute the water.
222
 The result is 
the same—a pollutant crossing from one medium (air) into another 
(water). By allowing states to regulate airborne mercury emissions, 
TMDLs for mercury arguably pave the way for application of the CWA 
to CO2.
223
 
Unfortunately, TMDL-based strategies have a potentially fatal flaw: 
enforcement. When faced with the daunting task of actually 
implementing TMDLs, states often focus on point sources over non-
point sources.
224
 This tendency is understandable—non-point source 
pollution is, by definition, decentralized, often difficult to identify, and 
correspondingly expensive to regulate.
225
 Oliver Houck, one of the 
nation’s leading TMDL scholars, has outlined the long history of 
lackluster enforcement with respect to non-point sources.
226
 According 
to Houck, the most basic weakness of the program is the lack of 
                                                     
216. EPA TMDLs, supra note 104. 
217. Id.  
218. Id.  
219. Id.  
220. The EPA has conducted years of research into modeling the “spread” of airborne mercury 
pollution, and provides guidance on its website for entities seeking to promulgate TMDL quantities. 
Id.; see also EPA, NO. 453/R-01-009, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT ATMOSPHERIC 
DEPOSITION: A HANDBOOK FOR WATERSHED MANAGERS (2001). While the specific models would 
not apply to carbon dioxide, similar principles apply. Id. 
221. See, e.g., EPA TMDLs, supra note 104. 
222. See id. (discussing deposition of airborne CO2 and mercury). 
223. See, e.g., id. 
224. See, e.g., OLIVER A. HOUCK, CLEAN WATER ACT TMDL PROGRAM: LAW, POLICY AND 
IMPLEMENTATION (2d ed. 2002); Houck, supra note 108. 
225. See, e.g., Daniel R. Mandelker, Controlling Nonpoint Source Water Pollution: Can It Be 
Done?, 65 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 479, 479 (1989) (summarizing the challenges regulators face when 
addressing non-point source pollution). 
226. See HOUCK, supra note 224. 
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effective EPA oversight.
227
 Officially, the EPA has approval power over 
state TMDLs.
228
 In reality, this power is strictly limited. The EPA can 
only compel TMDL enforcement by rejecting the state’s implementation 
plan. This rejection authority is limited to plans that are 
“impracticable.”229 In other words, an ineffective TMDL implementation 
plan, by itself, is not grounds for disapproval by the EPA.
230
 Ultimately, 
it seems that a TMDL for acidity is a step in the right direction—but not 
a regulatory silver bullet.
231
 
III. A POSSIBLE ROLE FOR TRIBES IN ENCOURAGING NON-
POINT SOURCE ENFORCEMENT 
Updating the CWA’s WQS to obtain a TMDL for ocean acidification 
could breathe new life into the law.
232
 However, the TMDL enforcement 
issue raises questions about this strategy’s likely real-world impact. 
Accordingly, Part III of this Comment offers a possible fix: engagement 
with select Native American tribes. In the Pacific Northwest, tribes party 
to the Stevens Treaties should be treated as key stakeholders in the fight 
against ocean acidification. Specifically, this Comment argues that tribal 
treaty rights to fish and shellfish could be used to compel state 
regulatory action—including enforcement of TMDLs.233 
Washington State’s first governor, Isaac Stevens, negotiated a series 
of land control treaties with the Native American tribes in the region.
234
 
Known collectively as the “Stevens Treaties,” these agreements 
exchanged grants of land to settlers for (among other things) guarantees 
of tribal fishing rights.
235
 As demonstrated by the landmark United 
                                                     
227. Id.; Peter M. Lacy, Addressing Water Pollution from Livestock Grazing After ONDA v. 
Dombeck: Legal Strategies Under the Clean Water Act, 30 ENVTL. L. 617, 623–24 (2000) 
(asserting that the sections of CWA dealing with nonpoint source pollution, sections 319 and 208, 
have failed because they are largely driven by federal grants and do not provide EPA with effective 
enforcement authority). 
228. See, e.g., 40 CFR § 130.7(d) (2015). 
229. See, e.g., HOUCK, supra note 224; Lacy, supra note 227, at 623–24. 
230. See, e.g., HOUCK, supra note 224. 
231. See, e.g., id. 
232. See supra Part II. 
233. See Treaty of Point Elliot art. 5, Jan. 22, 1855, http://www.goia.wa.gov/treaties/ 
treaties/pointelliot.htm [https://perma.cc/6AG8-VSYE]; United States v. Washington (Washington 
I), 384 F. Supp. 312, 401 (W.D. Wash. 1974), aff’d, 520 F.2d 676, 685 (9th Cir. 1975) 
(summarizing case history through 1975 and holding the Stevens Treaties imbue the tribal parties 
with federally-protected rights to fish). 
234. See, e.g., Treaty of Point Elliot, supra note 233. 
235. See id., at art. 5. 
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States v. Washington line of cases,
236
 the Stevens Treaties establish 
federally protected tribal rights to harvest fish and shellfish.
237
 Because 
these rights are meaningless if there are no fish or shellfish left, 
Washington has an obligation to preserve the fisheries.
238
 Accordingly, 
the Stevens Treaties Tribes (“Tribes”) may have a colorable claim 
against Washington State based on its lack of response to the threat of 
ocean acidification.
239
 
While the Tribes could bring this treaty-based allegation as a stand-
alone claim, the best chance of achieving meaningful regulations may 
actually be to combine a treaty enforcement claim with the TMDL 
strategy discussed in Part II. If updated water quality standards led to a 
TMDL for acidification, a treaty enforcement claim might be able to 
address the criticism
240
 of TMDLs (lackluster non-point source 
enforcement) by enjoining the state to undertake specific enforcement 
actions.
241
 This approach re-conceptualizes the TMDL as an 
enforcement structure—lacking the desired real-world effect by itself, 
but capable of channeling an external source of legal authority. 
To better explore the possibility of a treaty rights claim as a response 
to ocean acidification, Section III.A begins by outlining the tribal 
interests threatened by acidification. Section III.B then turns to the 
United States v. Washington line of cases, which establish that 
Washington State has a federally enforceable duty to safeguard treaty-
protected fish and shellfish. Of particular interest is the “culverts case,” a 
sub-proceeding of United States v. Washington.
242
 In that case, a federal 
district court judge ordered Washington to remove or repair fish-
blocking culverts beneath state roads.
243
 Currently on appeal to the Ninth 
Circuit,
244
 the culverts litigation demonstrates that tribal treaty interests 
                                                     
236. See, e.g., Washington I, 384 F. Supp. at 401. 
237. Id. 
238. Id. 
239. See Treaty of Point Elliot, supra note 233, at art. 5. 
240. See, e.g., HOUCK, supra note 224. 
241. This is analogous to the culverts sub-proceeding, in which the U.S. District Court for the 
Western District of Washington enjoined the State from removing fish-blocking culverts that 
deprived tribes of access to treaty-protected fish. See United States v. Washington, 20 F. Supp. 3d 
828, 889–90 (W.D. Wash. 2007) (discussing the six-year history of the culverts sub-proceeding). 
242. See id. 
243. Id. 
244. A three-judge panel heard oral arguments in Seattle on October 16, 2015. As of this writing, 
the Ninth Circuit has not yet issued an opinion. See United States v. Washington, No. 13-35474, 
U.S. COURTS FOR NINTH CIRCUIT, http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/media/ 
view.php?pk_id=0000014845 [https://perma.cc/4AAZ-9E92] (last visited Feb. 14, 2016) 
(containing the docket information and audio recordings of the oral arguments). 
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are sufficiently robust to compel state conservation action.
245
 If upheld, 
the culverts case represents a possible model for a treaty enforcement 
action based on ocean acidification. 
A. Ocean Acidification Threatens Protected Tribal Interests 
Ocean acidification threatens tribal welfare because it negatively 
affects fish and shellfish that are economically, culturally, and 
religiously important to tribal communities.
246
 By harming pteropods, a 
key food source for juvenile salmon,
247
 acidification threatens 
populations of salmon that Pacific Northwestern tribes harvest for food 
and sale.
248
 Shellfish like the Pacific oyster are also at risk.
249
 Like 
salmon, shellfish are important resources for tribes like the Lummi
250
 
and the Swinomish,
251
 whose reservations include thousands of acres of 
tidelands suitable for shellfish cultivation. Of course, tribal interests in 
fish and shellfish go beyond cultural and economic concerns—because 
their right to take fish is codified by treaty, it is also a colorable legal 
interest.
252
 
In 1854 and 1855, Native American tribes residing in what is now 
Washington State entered into a series of agreements allocating land and 
resources between the native tribes and western settlers. Known as the 
Stevens Treaties (“Treaties”), these agreements included language 
guaranteeing the Tribes the right to continue their traditional fishing 
practices: “The right of taking fish, at all usual and accustomed grounds 
and stations, is further secured to said Indians, in common with all 
citizens of the Territory . . . .”253 Intended to secure vital resources for 
                                                     
245. See Washington, 20 F. Supp. 3d at 889–99. 
246. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
247. See, e.g., Doney et al., supra note 4, at 177. 
248. The United States v. Washington court describes the tribe’s party to the Stevens Treaties as 
“heavily dependent upon harvesting anadromous fish . . . particularly salmon.” Washington I, 384 F. 
Supp. 312, 355 (W.D. Wash. 1974), aff’d, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975). In one of the original treaty 
rights interpretation cases, United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905), the United States Supreme 
Court noted that fishing was “not much less necessary to the existence of the Indians than the 
atmosphere they breathed.” Id. at 381. 
249. See Kurihara et al., supra note 6, at 91. 
250. A Sovereign People, supra note 194 (noting that the Lummi reservation includes 13,000 
acres of tidelands). 
251. The Swinomish People, supra note 196 (noting that the Swinomish reservation includes 2900 
acres of tidelands). 
252. See generally Washington I, 384 F. Supp. at 327. 
253. See Treaty of Point Elliot, supra note 233, at art. 5; United States v. Washington 
(Washington II), 506 F. Supp. 187, 189 (W.D. Wash. 1980), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 694 F.2d 
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the tribes,
254
 this single sentence has instead produced over a century of 
litigation.
255
 
In 1974, the famous Judge Boldt opinion, United States v. 
Washington (Washington I),
256
 clarified Tribal fishing rights under the 
Treaties. Judge Boldt affirmed that tribal members have a protected right 
to fish from their traditional sites (“usual and accustomed grounds and 
stations”).257 This right remains in force even if those stations are outside 
modern reservation boundaries, or on private property owned by non-
Indians.
258
 Tribes, in turn, are obliged to allow non-Indians to fish 
alongside them.
259
 However, the Treaties reserve a certain portion of the 
total sustainably harvestable catch for the Tribes: enough to make a 
“moderate living,” or fifty percent, whichever is lower.260 Later 
decisions applied these rules to shellfish as well, finding that shellfish 
are “fish” under the Treaties.261 Thus, the Tribes also have the right to 
harvest shellfish both on and off-reservation—even if the “usual and 
accustomed” harvesting location is currently occupied by a commercial 
grower.
262
 
Although the Treaties are silent on the specific location or amount of 
fish to be harvested,
263
 the United States Supreme Court ultimately 
upheld Judge Boldt’s “usual and accustomed” stations interpretation, as 
well as the fifty-fifty allocation of the harvest.
264
 In its decision, the 
                                                     
1374 (9th Cir. 1982). 
254. “A primary concern of the Indians whose way of life was so heavily dependent upon 
harvesting anadromous fish, was that they have freedom to move about to gather food, particularly 
salmon.” Washington I, 384 F. Supp. at 355. 
255. Winans was the first of the Stevens Treaty cases to come before the U.S. Supreme Court. See 
United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905). 
256. 384 F. Supp. 312, 355 (W.D. Wash. 1974), aff’d, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975). 
257. Washington I, 384 F. Supp. at 331. 
258. Id. 
259. Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658, 668 
n.12 (1979). 
260. Id. at 686. Neither party has a right to destroy the treaty resource (i.e., the fishery). See 
United States v. Washington, 520 F.2d 676, 685 (9th Cir. 1975). 
261. United States v. Washington, 873 F. Supp. 1422, 1427 (W.D. Wash. 1994), aff’d, 157 F.3d 
630 (9th Cir. 1998); United States v. Washington, 898 F. Supp. 1453 (W.D. Wash. 1995), aff’d, 157 
F.3d 630 (9th Cir. 1998).  
262. See generally Washington, 873 F. Supp. at 1427; Washington, 898 F. Supp. 1453. Note that 
the Treaties do contain a clause limiting tribal shellfish rights relative to non-Indian individuals. 
This so-called “Shellfish Proviso” states that Indians “shall not take shellfish from any beds staked 
or cultivated by citizens.” Treaty of Point Elliot, supra note 233, at art. V. 
263. Treaty of Point Elliot, supra note 233, at art. 5; see also Washington II, 506 F. Supp. 187, 
189 (W.D. Wash. 1980), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 694 F.2d 1374 (9th Cir. 1982). 
264. Treaty of Point Elliot, supra note 233, at art. 5; see also Washington II, 506 F. Supp. at 189. 
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Court reemphasized the “vital importance of the fisheries”265 to the 
Tribes, having previously stated in United States v. Winans
266
 that 
fishing was “not much less necessary to the existence of the Indians than 
the atmosphere they breathed.”267 Perhaps more significantly, the Court 
reaffirmed the unique canons of statutory interpretation that modern 
American courts apply when analyzing tribal treaties.
268
 Generally 
speaking, “treaties are construed more liberally than private agreements, 
and to ascertain their meaning [courts] may look beyond the written 
words to the history of the treaty, the negotiations, and the practical 
construction adopted by the parties.”269 
Given that accurate historical information is not always available, 
these canons of interpretation allow ambiguity to be resolved in favor of 
tribes.
270
 In the context of United States v. Washington, courts apply this 
canon by considering what the Tribes believed the Treaties to guarantee 
to be as important as the text itself.
271
 Here, the tribes believed—and still 
believe—that the Treaties guaranteed them the right to a significant 
amount of fish, forever.
272
 This interpretation is based on direct 
representations made by Governor Stevens.
273
 Stevens told the Tribes, 
“this paper secures your fish.”274 As the Ninth Circuit observed, 
“[d]uring the negotiations, the United States repeatedly assured the 
Indians that they would continue to enjoy a permanent right to fish as 
they always had in the places where they always had.”275 On the strength 
of this record, both the Ninth Circuit and the United States Supreme 
Court affirmed the Tribes’ right to take up to fifty percent of the 
available fish from their usual and accustomed stations.
276
 
                                                     
265. Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658, 666 
n.12 (1979). 
266. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905). 
267. Id. at 381. 
268. Choctaw Nation of Indians v. United States, 318 U.S. 423, 431–32 (1943). 
269. Id. 
270. See United States v. Washington, 157 F.3d 630, 643 (9th Cir. 1998) (stating that courts 
“[h]ave uniformly held that treaties must be liberally construed in favor of establishing Indian 
rights.”).  
271. “[I]importance should be given to the Indians’ likely understanding of the . . . words in the 
treaties and especially the reference to the “‘right of taking fish,’” Wash. State Commercial 
Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S. at 678. 
272. Answering Brief of the Appellee-Cross-Appellant Indian Tribes at 17, United States v. 
Washington, No. 13-35474 (9th Cir. Jan. 21, 2014).  
273. State v. Moses, 79 Wash. 2d 104, 139, 483 P.2d 838, 851 (1971). 
274. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S. at 667 n.11. 
275. Washington, 157 F.3d at 649. 
276. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S. at 668; Washington I, 
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B. The United States v. Washington Culverts Litigation: A Possible 
Model for Stevens Treaties Claims Based on Ocean Acidification 
The purpose of Judge Boldt’s holding in Washington I is to fairly 
allocate a shared resource—the available fishing stations are divided 
between Indians and non-Indians, as is the total annual catch.
277
 
Underlying this allocation is the assumption that fish will always be 
available.
278
 However, declining fish runs, under pressure from 
overfishing, habitat destruction, and water quality-related harms, soon 
called this assumption into question.
279
 In fact, Judge Boldt himself 
recognized that because the “right secured by the treaties . . . exists in 
part to provide a volume of fish which is sufficient to the fair needs of 
the tribe . . . . Neither the Indians nor the non-Indians may fish in a 
manner so as to destroy the resource.”280 Short of total destruction, 
however, it was unclear what obligation the parties had to preserve their 
common resource—or at the very least, to avoid becoming the agent of 
harm. These questions are at the heart of the ongoing United States v. 
Washington culverts sub-proceeding. 
In 2001, the Tribes filed suit against the State of Washington alleging 
violations of the Treaties.
281
 The Tribes claimed that by constructing and 
maintaining a statewide system of culverts that blocked salmon from 
returning upstream, Washington limited the number of salmon returning 
to the Tribes’ usual and accustomed stations.282 The Tribes argued that 
the culverts impacted salmon runs “to the extent that such diminishment 
impairs the Tribes’ ability to earn a moderate living from their 
fisheries.”283 Joined by the United States, the Tribes sought declaratory 
and injunctive relief, asking the court to affirm their interpretation of the 
Treaties and order the removal of the offending culverts.
284
 On August 
                                                     
384 F. Supp. 312, 401 (W.D. Wash. 1974), aff’d, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975). 
277. Washington I, 384 F. Supp. at 401. 
278. Id. at 430. 
279. C. JEFF CEDERHOLM ET AL., PACIFIC SALMON AND WILDLIFE—ECOLOGICAL CONTEXTS, 
RELATIONSHIPS, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR MANAGEMENT iv (2d ed. 2000). 
280. Washington I, 384 F. Supp. at 401 (emphasis added). 
281. United States v. Washington, 20 F. Supp. 3d 828, 889–90 (W.D. Wash. 2007) (discussing 
the six-year history of the culverts sub-proceeding). 
282. Id. 
283. Plaintiff Tribes’ Motion and Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment, at 1, United States v. Washington, No. C70-9213, 2006 WL 2882968 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 
14, 2006), 2006 WL 2825386 (emphasis added). 
284. Washington, 20 F. Supp. 3d at 889–90 (discussing the six-year history of the culverts sub-
proceeding). 
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23, 2007, the district court ruled in favor of the Tribes.
285
 The court then 
held a seven day bench trial to determine the appropriate remedy (e.g., 
which culverts should be removed and how quickly).
286
 Finally, on 
March 29, 2013, more than a decade after the Tribes’ original Request 
for Determination, the court issued its final memorandum order and 
permanent injunction.
287
 
Finding in favor of the Tribes, the district court held that “[t]he right 
of taking fish, secured to the Tribes in the Stevens Treaties, imposes a 
duty upon the State to refrain from building or operating culverts under 
State-maintained roads that hinder fish passage and thereby diminish the 
number of fish that would otherwise be available for Tribal harvest.”288 
Washington’s construction and maintenance of culverts impededing fish 
return violated the State’s duty under the Treaties. Accordingly, the 
court ordered Washington to expedite removal of the harmful culverts.
289
 
The district court’s holding in this case is instructive in that the court 
frames the State’s duty as a negative one. Rather than implying a 
positive duty to preserve or conserve the fisheries, the court instead finds 
that the culverts represent a failure of Washington’s negative duty—to 
refrain from harming the fish supply.
290
 While the court-ordered remedy 
(timely culvert removal) requires the State to take “positive” action, this 
does not change the negative nature of the underlying duty: non-
interference with tribal rights to fish. Because a treaty allocating fish 
would be undermined by the destruction of the fishery, the court in 
Washington I found that the Treaties’ fishing clauses necessarily imply a 
restriction on each party’s authority to destroy their shared resource.291 
However, Judge Boldt’s holding stops short of finding a general fishery 
conservation interest inherent in the Treaties—Washington I’s limitation 
on the parties vests only once fish populations decline nearly to the point 
of extinction.
292
 
In 1980, the district court further considered whether the Treaties 
impose habitat protection responsibilities on the State (“Phase II” of the 
                                                     
285. Id. 
286. See generally United States v. Washington, 20 F. Supp. 3d 986, 1023–24 (W.D. Wash. 
2013) (issuing permanent injunction regarding Culvert Correction). 
287. Id. 
288. United States v. Washington, 20 F. Supp. 3d 828, 889–90 (W.D. Wash. 2007). 
289. Id. 
290. Id. 
291. Washington I, 384 F. Supp. 312, 401 (W.D. Wash. 1974), aff’d, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 
1975). 
292. Id. 
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United States v. Washington saga).
293
 Although the court held that the 
Treaties do impose habitat protection duties, it again phrased this 
obligation negatively.
294
 The district court held that the Treaties required 
Washington to “refrain from degrading the fish habitat to an extent that 
would deprive the tribes of their moderate living needs.”295 
Characterizing a proactive conservational responsibility as a negative 
treaty right may begin to strain credulity. Perhaps indicating an 
awareness of this critique, the Washington II opinion directly addresses 
the negative rights issue: 
Contrary to the State’s apprehensions . . . this case [does not] 
involve an attempt by plaintiffs to impose an affirmative duty on 
the State to protect the fish habitat. Rather, plaintiffs seek the 
recognition of a negative duty such that when the State exercises 
its broad regulatory powers it does not impair the environmental 
conditions necessary for the survival of the treaty fish.
296
 
Because the district court’s interpretation would require Washington 
to consider and avoid harm to fish habitat in the course of its normal 
exercise of regulatory power, it went further than Judge Boldt’s 
relatively narrow prohibition of destruction in Washington I.
297
 
After years of litigation, an en banc panel of the Ninth Circuit vacated 
the district court’s habitat conservation holding in Washington II.298 
Interestingly, the vacatur did not explicitly reject the district court’s 
treaty interpretation. The Ninth Circuit could simply have found that a 
habitat conservation duty cannot be implied from the Treaties; instead, 
the panel took issue with the factual standard required to support a 
specific articulation of Washington’s treaty responsibilities.299 The 
Ninth Circuit held that the district court’s sweeping prohibition against a 
category of state actions (i.e., those harmful to fish) was “contrary to the 
exercise of sound judicial discretion” in the context of a facial challenge 
like Washington II.
300
 What was missing, in the panel’s view, was a 
                                                     
293. See generally Washington II, 506 F. Supp. 187 (W.D. Wash. 1980), aff’d in part, rev’d in 
part, 694 F.2d 1374 (9th Cir. 1982). 
294. Id. at 208. 
295. See id. 
296. Id. at 206–07. 
297. In this view, a maximally invasive duty would take the additional step of requiring 
affirmative action and may run afoul of the constitutional prohibition against state conscription. Id. 
at 208; see also Washington I, 384 F. Supp. 312, 401 (W.D. Wash. 1974), aff’d, 520 F.2d 676 (9th 
Cir. 1975). 
298. United States v. Washington, 759 F.2d 1353, 1357–58 (1985). 
299. Id. 
300. Id. 
18 - LeMay.docx (Do Not Delete) 3/27/2016  3:50 PM 
2016] OUR CORROSIVE OCEANS 397 
 
detailed factual record carefully demonstrating the connection between 
specific state actions and harm to treaty-protected salmon.
301
 Because 
the court reached the decision to vacate on technical grounds,
302
 it 
remained silent on the underlying question of treaty interpretation. The 
Ninth Circuit’s silence seems to imply that the Treaties may indeed 
support the very type of conservation obligation found by the district 
court—provided the duty is “defin[ed] and articulat[ed] upon concrete 
facts which underlie a dispute.”303 
The U.S. v. Washington culverts litigation, by establishing that 
Washington has a concrete duty to remedy harm to treaty-protected 
salmon habitat, succeeds where Washington II failed. As discussed, the 
district court’s attempt in Washington II to expand Judge Boldt’s narrow 
prohibition against fishery destruction was ultimately unsuccessful.
304
 In 
response, the parties in the culverts litigation adopted a narrower legal 
strategy: whether or not the Treaties impose a general habitat 
conservation duty on Washington, the parties argued that the Treaties do 
impose a negative duty on the State to refrain from specific actions 
known to harm tribal salmon.
305
 Moreover, the Tribes and United States 
arrived in court armed with a detailed factual record demonstrating how 
building and maintaining culverts (the specific state action) led to a 
reduction in the number of fish available to tribes (the treaty-proscribed 
harm).
306
 
On appeal, the parties’ briefs in the culverts litigation discuss the 
Washington II “concrete facts” standard in some detail.307 In the reply 
brief of the United States, for example, the government dedicates a 
section to the argument that the factual record adequately supports Judge 
Martinez’s permanent injunction.308 The key distinction, according to the 
United States, is that the respondents need not demonstrate every aspect 
of the complex science behind declining salmon runs to sustain their 
case. Instead, the only truly important fact is not in dispute: that 
Washington constructs and maintains culverts that harm treaty-protected 
                                                     
301. Id. 
302. Id. 
303. Id. 
304. Id. 
305. Response Brief of the United States of America at 45–47, United States v. Washington, No. 
13-35474 (9th Cir. Jan. 21, 2014). 
306. Id. 
307. Id. 
308. Id. 
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salmon.
309
 
In addition, the plaintiffs in the culverts case avoided the concerns 
expressed in Washington II by seeking a narrowly tailored remedy—as 
opposed to asking the court to impose undefined conservation duties on 
the State.
310
 In terms of effort and cost, the Martinez order is more 
immediately burdensome on the State than the general conservation duty 
contemplated in Washington II.
311
 At the same time, the order is also 
more limited in scope: the injunction only applies to culverts on state 
land.
312
 Furthermore, the order establishes a reasonable removal 
schedule (setting priority based on the number of fish blocked), rather 
than requiring the immediate removal of all harmful culverts.
313
 
If upheld on appeal, the culverts case may serve as a potential model 
for treaty-based ocean acidification claims. The culverts litigation 
demonstrates that the Treaties can be interpreted to compel protective 
state action.
314
 Moreover, the threshold at which these treaty protections 
vest—when the fisheries are no longer adequate to support a “moderate 
living” for the Tribes315—is already met. In the culverts opinion, Judge 
Martinez found as a matter of law that tribal income from fishing is 
already below the “moderate living” threshold.316 Therefore, this 
element is satisfied with respect to the United States v. Washington line 
of cases.
317
 Importantly, the treaty fishing clauses describe tribal rights 
in terms of guaranteed income; the Treaties are agnostic as to the cause 
of income impairment.
318
 Therefore, the threshold for abrogating the 
Treaties is simply when—as now—there are too few fish at the Tribes’ 
usual and accustomed stations to meet the “moderate living” standard.319 
The cause of this harm, whether driven by culverts or ocean 
acidification, should not define the shape of the right itself. In either 
scenario, the relevant harm is the harm to tribal income. So long as there 
                                                     
309. Id. 
310. United States v. Washington, 759 F.2d 1353, 1357–58 (9th Cir. 1985). 
311. United States v. Washington, 20 F. Supp. 3d 986, 1023–24 (W.D. Wash. 2013); Washington, 
759 F.2d at 1357–58. 
312. Response Brief of the United States of America, supra note 305, at 45. 
313. Id. 
314. See, e.g., United States v. Washington, 20 F. Supp. 3d 986; Washington, 759 F.2d at 1357–
58. 
315. Treaty of Point Elliot, supra note 233, at art. 5. 
316. United States v. Washington, 20 F. Supp. 3d 828 (W.D. Wash. 2007). 
317. See, e.g., United States v. Washington, 626 F. Supp. 1405, 1476–78 (W.D. Wash. 1985). 
318. Treaty of Point Elliot, supra note 233, at art. 5. 
319. Washington, 20 F. Supp. 3d at 889–90. 
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are too few salmon to generate a moderate income from fishing, the 
guarantees of the Treaties are not being met.
320
 The logic for ocean 
acidification and tribal treaty rights to shellfish is similar: the right of 
access to usual and accustomed tidelands and beaches is of little use if 
the water is too acidic to support oyster fertilization and cultivation. 
If Tribes were to pair an ocean acidification treaty rights claim with 
the CWA strategy discussed in Part II, the requested remedy for the 
treaty claim could be specific enforcement of the acidification TMDL. In 
addition to addressing Houck’s critique of TMDLs, the treaty claim 
itself would also be strengthened by limiting its requested relief to 
enforcement of existing state regulations. By contrast, a standalone 
treaty claim would likely founder on the shoals of Washington II: any 
effective remedy would necessarily involve some form of novel 
regulation, which is far more ambitious than the district court’s (failed) 
attempt to impose a state duty to refrain from degrading fish habitat.
321
 
Instead, seeking improved enforcement of an additional TMDL is both 
narrower and more analogous to the injunctive dynamic in the culverts 
litigation. In that case, Washington State had already initiated a program 
to remove the offending culverts by the time the district court issued the 
final injunction in 2013. Instead of requiring Washington to initiate a 
new culvert removal process, Judge Martinez ordered the state to expand 
and improve its existing program.
322
 Similarly, requiring Washington 
State to redouble its efforts to enforce an existing TMDL would, 
technically speaking, be “working within the system” rather than seeking 
to compel the state to promulgate a novel regulatory program. 
CONCLUSION 
Ocean acidification—and the release of CO2 that drives it—represents 
a real and present danger to a host of marine organisms. The danger is 
real for humans as well, including aquaculture-dependent Native 
American tribes. Given the difficulty in obtaining tort relief for causally 
complex harms, updating the CWA water quality criteria provides a 
potential path to regulation of ocean acidification via the TMDL regime. 
                                                     
320. See generally United States v. Washington, 759 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir. 1985); Treaty of Point 
Elliot, supra note 233, at art. 5. 
321. Washington II, 506 F. Supp. 187, 208 (W.D. Wash. 1980), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 694 
F.2d 1374 (9th Cir. 1982). 
322. Specifically, the district court ordered the State to prioritize culvert removal based on the 
significance of harm. The court also rejected Washington’s proposed schedule, noting that at its pre-
order pace the State would need 100 years to remove all the affected culverts. See Washington, 20 
F. Supp. 3d at 889–90. 
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While TMDL enforcement for non-point sources is problematic, it is 
possible that tribal treaty rights claims could bolster TMDL 
enforcement. Whatever the solution, it is clear that complex 
environmental pollution processes like ocean acidification require an 
evolved regulatory response. America’s current environmental 
regulatory regime, divided amongst media-specific pollution control 
statutes, is outclassed by trans-media pollutants like CO2. 
 
